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NATIONALISM: THE CENTRIFUGAL FORCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

by

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December, 1995

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NATIONALISM: THE CENTRIFUGAL FORCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

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of the requirements for the degree of


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
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


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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted discussions regarding the possibility of a collective security format for the Asia-Pacific region. Constructing a new regional order under a collective multilateral security organization will be an unrealistic task for policy makers as the world approaches the twenty-first century. Nationalism has resurfaced in the relations of the Northeast Asian countries and will be the primary obstacle to establishing such a security forum. The historical suspicions of these states is evident in their assertiveness regarding the complex territorial disputes, increased military expenditures, economic competition, and dependence on external natural resources. The security environment of Northeast Asia is significantly more hostile and vulnerable to conflict in the future. Although perceptions of a multilateral security framework have been expressed, no Northeast Asian state is willing to forfeit sovereignty in favor of collective security. To protect the United States' vital interests in the region will require acknowledgment of Northeast Asian nationalism and respect for regional insecurities. A reassessment of the existing bilateral alliances and the forging of new bilateral agreements will provide the greatest flexibility for the United States to adjust to the emerging new order in East Asia.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted discussions regarding the possibility of a multilateral security format for the Asia-Pacific region. Constructing a "new regional order" under a collective multilateral security regime will be an unrealistic task for United States' policymakers as the world approaches the twenty-first century. The security environment of Northeast Asia is significantly more hostile and vulnerable to conflict in the future. Unlike the European community that has reduced its defense budgets the Asia-Pacific, particularly Northeast Asia, has increased its defense expenditures which include the acquisition of offensive weapons. Territorial disputes concerning the reunification of Korea, the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Island conflict, the PRC-Taiwan issue, the Kurile Island dilemma, and the PRC's claim to the Spratly Islands, remain sensitive bilateral security issues. Moreover, the search for respect in regional and world power relations is prevalent in the foreign policies of the PRC, Japan, and South Korea.

The Asia-Pacific, particularly Northeast Asia, is of vital interest to the United States. Economically, United States trade with the Asia-Pacific region totaled over 374 billion dollars in 1993, forty percent higher than American trade with Europe, and accounted for 2.8 million United States' jobs. American two-way trade with Asia accounts for one-third of total American world trade. Japan has the second largest GNP in the world and based on projected growth rates the PRC is expected to be the largest economic entity by the year 2002. Therefore, the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific is vital to American national security. The magnitude of American interest will prevent any "withdrawal" of the United States from the region.

Despite the importance of economics and the trend towards economic interdependence, the development of a multilateral security regime, similar to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or a NATO-like institution, will not emerge in Northeast Asia. The Northeast Asian nations have a similar interest, economic prosperity, but there is no consensus on how this will be determined nor that interdependence will promote stability. The historical relationship between the Northeast

Asian states is only one of the obstacles that this thesis analyzes, that will prevent the formation of a collective security organization. Unlike Europe, there was never any collective security pact between the Northeast Asian states throughout the Cold War. Security was maintained through alliances with one of the superpowers. The absence of the larger Cold War security dynamic has caused a shift in the balance of power in the region. Nationalism, once overshadowed by the larger superpower security dynamic, has reemerged.

The significant historical relations between China, Japan, and Korea have determined their tone of diplomacy. The national security concerns and threat perceptions that each state perceives in the others is submerged in this historical suspicion. Despite levels of economic interdependence, nationalistic overtones cloud foreign relations as each country modernizes its military and a significant amount of tension exists over security issues. Chinese leaders focus on a stronger China becoming a dominant player in regional affairs. To do so, the PRC must continue its economic reform, maintain a consistent level of economic growth, minimize internal instability, and promote a peaceful environment to achieve economic development. The century of "shame and humiliation" weighs heavily in the Chinese memory and cannot be dismissed from Chinese decision making. A strong military will boost the PRC's prestige and credibility concerning claims on territorial interests. Sino-Japanese relations have gone through a series of cycles of stability and tension over the last century. The PRC's position in the South China Sea, its quest for natural resources, and purchases of offensive weapons, have caused notable apprehension in Japan. Sino-Korean relations, although not adversarial, remain enclosed in a Cold War fog. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula has been of strategic importance to both Japan and China and will continue to be a fulcrum in the emerging security environment. The PRC supports a "two track" Korea policy maintaining relations with both Koreas to promote its national interests. A reunified Korea could be in the best interest of a successfully modernized PRC in the long term, however, in the short term, the PRC will promote the status quo. South Korea is wary over PRC military expenditures and its existing relations with the DPRK. In the

wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and Sino-South Korean normalization, North Korea questions PRC loyalty to a reunified Korea under a DPRK regime.

Japan has sought a greater role in the international environment. Japanese leaders seek greater power parity commensurate with Japan's economic strength. The PRC and South Korea are watchful of increased overseas deployment of Japanese Self Defense Forces, military expenditures, the Japanese quest for a seat on the UN Security Council, and Japanese economic dominance. Mistrust and misunderstanding have marked Japanese-South Korean relations since normalization in 1965. North Korean-Japanese relations have been inconsistent. North Korea remains a direct threat to South Korea whereas the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is the primary security concern of Japan. Increased military operations and closer ties with North Korea are a direct play by the Japanese to establish a better position in the emerging balance of power in the face of recent Sino-South Korean and Russo-South Korean normalization. South Korea is acutely aware that a sudden collapse of the North would require financial assistance from Japan. This assistance would not come without some strings attached. The ROK would like to avoid any greater dependence on Japan. However, a strongly reunified Korea will be less dependent on Japanese capital and a stronger player in the regional balance of power. Both the PRC and Korea seek less dependence on Japan and will not necessarily be content to follow Japan into the twenty-first century.

The resurgence of nationalism, evident in the recent assertiveness over territorial sovereignty, military expenditures, World War Two apologies, trade disputes, economic advancement, and dependence on external natural resources, has led the Northeast Asian states to seek a new regional security environment. All three states are aware that a peaceful and stable environment is necessary for economic advancement. However, since all the nations are dependent on external trade, there will be competition for resources, concerns over sea lines of communication to protect energy imports, and levels of protectionism to promote domestic industry. Close economic ties do not mean rivalries will not occur. Memories of Japanese conduct during the early twentieth century has not been forgotten nor has the PRC's quest for dominance been overlooked.

Although perceptions of a multilateral security framework have been expressed, no Northeast Asian state is ready to forfeit sovereignty in favor of collective security. This does not suggest that efforts should not be made to promote multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific and the sub-region of Northeast Asia nor does it promote the status quo. The PRC, Japan, and South Korea are in favor of a multilateral security forum to discuss security issues as well as the establishment of a sub-regional forum for Northeast Asia. However, the PRC will not tolerate dialogue centered against PRC modernization nor give into military transparency. Neither Japan nor South Korea is ready to give up its existing alliance with the United States in favor of some regional collective security. A NATO or CSCE type framework will be inappropriate for Northeast Asia nor will the restructuring of an APEC or ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) to include security issues be an acceptable premise for collective security. Dialogue in these institutions will promote confidence building measures but will not promptly solve future, complex security issues.

Northeast Asian perceptions of multilateral security directly affect the United States' Asia-Pacific foreign policy. The Northeast Asian states are becoming increasingly nationalistic in their regional diplomacy. To protect American vital interests in the region, will require acknowledgment of the deep Northeast Asian insecurities and respect for Asian solutions. To better enhance the United States' reputation and position, policymakers should move towards a reassessment of American bilateral agreements with the Northeast Asian states to provide the greatest flexibility in future regional power distributions. Bilateral relations, based on "peace, commerce, and navigation," will provide the most favorable means to adjust to the emerging "new order" in the twenty-first century East Asia. Furthermore, the United States should forge new agreements with other regional actors to gain better leverage in the region. Undoubtedly, a level of military presence will be necessary to preserve stability in the region as nationalistic overtones characterize the future strategic environment. How the United States indicates its position in the region in the face of increasing Northeast Asian nationalism will be crucial to preserving regional stability.

I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted discussions regarding the possibility of a multilateral security format for the Asia-Pacific region. Constructing a "new regional order" under a collective multilateral security regime will be an unrealistic task for United States' policymakers as the world approaches the twenty-first century. The security environment of Northeast Asia is significantly more hostile and vulnerable to conflict in the future. Unlike the European community that has reduced its defense budgets the Asia-Pacific, particularly Northeast Asia, has increased its defense expenditures including the acquisition of offensive weapons. Territorial disputes concerning the reunification of Korea, the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Island conflict, the PRC-Taiwan issue, the Kurile Island dilemma, and the PRC's claim to the Spratly Islands, remain sensitive bilateral security issues. Moreover, the search for respect in regional and world power relations is prevalent in the foreign policies of the PRC, Japan, and South Korea.

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Despite the importance of economics and the trend towards economic interdependence, the development of a multilateral security regime, similar to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or a NATO-like institution,

¹ "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," Department of Defense, February 1995, pg. 2.

will not emerge in Northeast Asia. The Northeast Asian nations have a similar interest, economic prosperity, but there is no consensus on how this will be determined nor that interdependence will promote stability. This thesis does not attempt to prognosticate on the merits of NATO or the CSCE, the reasons for their success, nor their recent lack of success.² Clearly, the political, cultural, and economic characteristics of the European states are different than Northeast Asian members. The historical relationship between the Northeast Asian states is only one of the obstacles that this thesis analyzes that will prevent the formation of a collective security organization. Unlike Europe, there was never any collective security pact between the Northeast Asian states throughout the Cold War. Security was maintained through alliances with one of the superpowers. The absence of the larger Cold War security dynamic has caused a shift in the balance of power in the region and a resurfacing of Northeast Asian nationalism. Once overshadowed by the larger superpower security dynamic, nationalism has reemerged in the policy stances of the PRC, Japan, and Korea. Thus, there will not be a power vacuum as some have perceived in which Japan or the PRC will attempt to fill the void, but a regional transition of power in which Japan and the PRC will attempt to balance.

The objective of this thesis will be to answer the following questions:

- What has been the historical relationship between the Northeast Asian states?
- How have the relationships between each state affected their nationalism?
- What are the current threat perceptions of each state concerning the other two?
- What are the current views regarding Northeast Asian collective security?
- What should the United States' reaction be towards a more nationalistic Northeast Asia?

² For a more critical analysis see Weber, Steve, "Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO," *International Organization*, 46, no. 3, 1992.

- Given the nationalistic tendencies of the Northeast Asian states, what should be the focus of United States' Asian policy for the twenty-first century?

The following three chapters will analyze the historical relations between China, Japan, and Korea and the significant historical events that have determined the tone of their relations. The national security concerns and threat perceptions that each state sees in the others also will be described. Despite levels of economic interdependence, nationalistic overtones cloud foreign relations as each country modernizes its military and a significant amount of tension exists over security issues. Chinese leaders focus on a stronger China becoming a dominant player in regional affairs. To do so, the PRC must continue its economic reform, maintain a consistent level of economic growth, minimize internal instability, and promote a peaceful environment to achieve economic development. The century of "shame and humiliation" weighs heavily in the Chinese memory and cannot be dismissed from Chinese decision making. A strong military will boost the PRC's prestige and credibility concerning claims on territorial interests. Sino-Japanese relations have gone through a series of cycles of stability and tension over the last century. The PRC's position in the South China Sea, its quest for natural resources, and purchases of offensive weapons, have caused a notable apprehension in Japan. Sino-Korean relations, although not adversarial, remain engulfed in a Cold War fog. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula has been of strategic importance to both Japan and China and will continue to be a fulcrum in the emerging security environment. The PRC supports a "two track" Korea policy maintaining relations with both Koreas to best serve its national interests. A reunified Korea could be in the best interest of a successfully modernized PRC in the long term, however, in the short term, the PRC will promote the status quo. South Korea is wary over PRC military expenditures and its existing relations with the DPRK. Likewise, North Korea questions PRC loyalty to a reunified Korea under a DPRK regime following the recent Sino-South Korean normalization.

Japan has sought a greater role in the international environment. Japanese leaders seek greater power parity commensurate with Japan's economic strength. The PRC and South Korea are watchful of increased overseas deployment of Japanese Self Defense

Forces, military expenditures, the Japanese quest for a seat on the UN Security Council, and Japanese economic dominance. Mistrust and misunderstanding have marked Japanese-South Korean relations since normalization in 1965. North Korean-Japanese relations have been inconsistent. North Korea remains a direct threat to South Korea whereas the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is the primary security concern of Japan. Increased military operations and closer ties with North Korea are a direct play by the Japanese to establish a better position in the emerging balance of power in the face of recent Sino-South Korean and Russo-South Korean normalization. South Korea is acutely aware that a sudden collapse of the North would require financial assistance from Japan. This assistance would not come without some strings attached. The ROK would like to avoid any greater dependence on Japan. However, a strongly reunified Korea will be less dependent on Japanese capital and a stronger player in the regional balance of power. Both the PRC and Korea seek less dependence on Japan and will not necessarily be content to follow Japan into the twenty-first century.

The resurgence of nationalism, evident in the recent assertiveness over territorial sovereignty, military expenditures, World War Two apologies, trade disputes, economic advancement, and dependence on external natural resources, has led the Northeast Asian states to seek a new regional security environment. All three states are aware that a peaceful and stable environment is necessary for economic advancement. However, since all the nations are dependent on external trade, there will be competition for resources, concerns over sea lines of communication to protect energy imports, and levels of protectionism to promote domestic industry. Close economic ties do not mean rivalries will not occur. Memories of Japanese conduct during the early twentieth century has not been forgotten nor has the PRC's quest for dominance been overlooked.

Although perceptions of a multilateral security framework have been expressed, no Northeast Asian state is ready to forfeit sovereignty in favor of collective security. This does not suggest that efforts should not be made to promote multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific and the sub-region of Northeast Asia nor does it promote the status quo. The PRC, Japan, and South Korea, are in favor of a multilateral security forum to discuss security issues as well as the establishment of a sub-regional forum for Northeast

Asia. However, the PRC will not tolerate dialogue centered against PRC modernization nor give into military transparency. Neither Japan nor South Korea is ready to give up its existing alliance with the United States in favor of some regional collective security. A NATO or CSCE type framework will be inappropriate for Northeast Asia nor will the restructuring of an APEC or ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) to include security issues be an acceptable premise for collective security. Dialogue in these institutions will promote confidence building measures but will not promptly solve future, complex security issues.

Northeast Asian perceptions of multilateral security directly affect the United States' Asia-Pacific foreign policy. The Northeast Asian states are becoming increasingly nationalistic in their regional diplomacy. To protect American vital interests in the region will require acknowledgment of the deep Northeast Asian insecurities and respect for Asian solutions. To better enhance the United States' reputation and position, policymakers should move towards a reassessment of American bilateral agreements with the Northeast Asian states to provide the greatest flexibility in future, regional power distributions. Bilateral relations, based on "peace, commerce, and navigation," will provide the most favorable means to adjust to the emerging "new order" in the twenty-first century East Asia. Furthermore, the United States should forge new agreements with other regional actors to gain better leverage in the region. Undoubtedly, a level of military presence will be necessary to preserve stability in the region as nationalistic overtones characterize the future strategic environment. How the United States indicates its position in the region in the face of increasing Northeast Asian nationalism will be crucial to preserving regional stability.

A. DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. Nationalism

This thesis will analyze the critical events in the development of nationalism in the PRC, Japan, and Korea that have had an impact on the relationships between these countries. There are a number of definitions of nationalism but the one this thesis will utilize bases a country's nationalism on the long tradition's of its past:

Nationalism is not chiefly a product of physical geography, but rests on traditions of politics, religion, language, war, invasion, conquests, economics, and society, which have been fashioned by peculiar and often fortuitous circumstances....³

By examining nationalism from a historical perspective, reviewing the historical relationships between these countries and the impact these relations have had on nationalism, the foundation for where these countries may turn regarding future security relations can be set. Each of the Northeast Asian states has played a large role in the development of the other's nationalism. Considering the history of conflict, war, and uncertainty these countries will remain suspicious in terms of future security arrangements.

2. Collective Security

A "collective security system" or "collective defense" "...rests on the premise that peace is indivisible, so that war against one state is...considered a war against all."⁴ Underlining this concept is the fact that a collective response would prevent the rational hostile state to avoid confrontation, thus, the possibility of war would decline. Therefore, the members of a collective security framework are required to respond to aggression against one member regardless of who the attacker is and who the victim may be. The focus of this type of defense is primarily military force. Defense and deterrence are required to provide security for one group of states against another.⁵ NATO and the CSCE are alliance systems that pledge the indivisibility of threats to its members and ensure a collective response against a nation under attack. This assumes that the states of Northeast Asia will be willing to drop their flags for the defense of another or for the principles of collective security. Considering the current stances on territorial disputes, no

³ Hayes, C. J., in *The Dynamics of Nationalism*, ed. Louis L. Snyder, Princeton, NJ: D Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1964). pg. 26.

⁴ Ruggie, John, "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution," *International Organization*, 46, no. 3, Summer 1992, pg. 569.

⁵ Mack, Andrew and Kerr, Pauline, "The evolving security discourse in the Asia-Pacific," *The Washington Quarterly*, 18, no. 1, Winter 1995, pg. 132-133.

Northeast Asian State will be willing to forfeit national sovereignty in favor of some regional security institution.

3. Multilateral and Multilateralism

The term "multilateral" expresses the relationship among three or more states. It describes an institution. Multilateral also connotes the concept of parity among the actors. Within the multilateral relationship of several states, each actor should be dealt with on an equal level. A nationalistic PRC and Japan, seeking greater influence in the region, may not see the concept of equality as beneficial to either's national interests.

"Multilateralism" is an institutional norm that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of principles of conduct. Thus, "multilateralism" refers traditionally to collective security or collective defense defined by formal structures, controlled by governing bodies and international organizations.⁶ In Northeast Asia, multilateral dialogue can be promoted in an institutional-like forum resembling ARF but to establish a multilateral collective security framework or pure multilateralism that governs the behavior of all the states or constrains their activities is too idealistic.

⁶ Ruggie, John, "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution," 1992, pg. 566, 574.

II. NATIONALISM IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

A. CRITICAL HISTORICAL EVENTS IN NATIONALISTIC DEVELOPMENT

China's nationalism in the last century has been linked closely to its relations with Japan. The first section of this chapter will view the anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese themes characteristic of Chinese nationalism. The Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) in which Japan imitated Western imperialism regarding its interests in Korea, commenced this trend in Chinese nationalism. Japanese gains in Formosa (1895), Manchuria (1905), the issuance of the Twenty-one demands (1915), and the Manchurian incident (1931) and invasion (1937) all generated greater animosity towards China's eastern neighbors. Chinese and Japanese nationalisms acted against each other. Japanese incursions into China and demands during the First World War, provided a basis for national reunification movements in the 1920s. Likewise, the new, aggressive nationalism in China caused a rise of militarism and ultra-nationalism in Japan. Chinese suffering from 1937-45, led to internal revolution and the emergence of a Communist regime in 1949.

Sino-Japanese Cold War relations are the focus of the second section of this chapter. Nationalistic feelings were overshadowed by security threats facing both countries. Japan, concerned over the expansion of Communism, depended on United States security. Therefore, Japan's policy toward the PRC was primarily influenced by Sino-American relations.

The third section of this chapter will focus on Sino-Japanese post-Cold War relations that are overshadowed by these historical events. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union has opened up intense nationalistic feelings that were once contained by the greater threat of the two superpowers. China, once concerned with the Soviet threat, has reached a period of peaceful existence in East Asia. For both countries, concerns regarding economic development have come to the forefront as well as regional intentions based on a long history of animosity.

1. The Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki

Western imperialism affected China differently than Japan in the nineteenth century. Like Japan, it was forced open by the West in the 1840s and 1850s but China,

confident in its cultural superiority, rejected reform in the form of the West until the end of the century. China would not transform its Confucian culture to that of the "barbarian." This pressure would lead to the dismantling of the traditional culture for a new culture that could prevent the "imperialist humiliations" and restore Chinese dignity.¹ Among the primary humiliations was the defeat of the "Celestial Empire" in 1895. Prior to the war, surrounding countries acknowledged the Middle Kingdom by extending tribute to China. China had been the suzerain of its neighbors; China was considered the elder brother and the vassal country the younger brother who had to show proper Confucian deference to the elder. Periodic missions to the Beijing court by these neighbors showed their submissiveness to the Celestial Empire.² To Chinese officials, Japan was not a tributary to China, therefore, it did not matter and did not fit into China's scheme. It was aware of Japan's borrowing Chinese culture and institutions but was never a threat and scholarly contact was maintained with the neighbor to the east. The Koreans were seen as more superior than the Japanese because of their more consistent adoption of Chinese script, governmental institutions, religious and political traditions. On the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, China was more than confident. The military might of Japan did not impress the Chinese. China was unaware of the military tradition or the fighting style of the Japanese soldiers. Moreover, the report on Hideyoshi's campaign in Korea had been recorded as a defeat by the Ming forces. The Chinese continually emphasized the Chinese world order in which China reigned supreme and all other nations ranged in descending order around it.³ Several officials, knowledgeable in Japanese, wrote several reports and sent them back to China. However, Chinese officials, convinced of China's superiority, chose not to make use of such information.

Li Hung-chang, the viceroy at Tientsin, first acknowledged Chinese suspicion of Japan. In 1873, he warned the Peking government that;

¹ Johnson, Chalmers, "How China and Japan See Each Other", cited in *China and Japan*, ed. Alvin Coox and Hilary Conroy, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Inc., 1978), pg 6.

² Pye, Lucian, *China An Introduction*, (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), pg 120.

³ Chu, Samuel, "China's Attitudes Toward Japan at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War," in *The Chinese and the Japanese*, ed. Akira Iriye, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pg 80-81.

Japan's power is daily expanding, and her ambition is not small. Although the various European powers are strong, they are still seventy thousand li away, whereas Japan is as near as in the courtyard, or on the threshold.... Undoubtedly she will become China's permanent and great anxiety.⁴

Li Hung-chang was responsible for the maintenance of Korea, China's most strategic and most important tributary. The Chinese advised Korea to return a favorable response to Japanese efforts to "open" Korea to treaty relations in 1876. Amongst the issues of independence and reform in Korea, the Chinese were determined to maintain their tributary. With an increase of hostilities between Japan and China in Korea, the Tientsin agreement in 1885 called for the mutual abstention of interference in Korea and consultation if either chose to send troops into the region. In 1894, the Korean government asked for Chinese support in suppressing a rebellion and Yuan Shih-k'ai saw this as a great opportunity to transform Korea into a real Chinese satellite. Japan heard of the rise in military assistance and sent troops as well. Japan sought to solve the "Korean Problem" by issuing a set of reforms with China acting as a cosponsor. China refused to cooperate with their rivals and Korea hesitated in cooperating with the Japanese. Japan seized the royal palace, forcing the king to announce the end of Korean dependence upon China and request Japanese assistance against China. Korea suffered at the hands of two countries that professed they were fighting for her independence and reform. Japan crossed the Yalu into Manchuria, seized the Liaotung Peninsula, Dairen, and Port Arthur, and defeated the Chinese fleet in the Yellow Sea.

Japan had been influenced by the Confucian ethic, but exposure to the West allowed it to vigorously challenge Chinese suzerainty over Korea and open up the "Hermit Kingdom." This humiliating defeat of China ended in the Treaty of Shimonoseki by which China not only had to give up its claims over Korea and recognize its independence, but was also forced to cede to Japan Formosa, the Pescadore islands and the Liaotung peninsula in Manchuria. China extended to Japan the full range of privileges earlier given Western countries under the unequal treaties, granted navigation rights on the Yangtze,

⁴ Jansen, Marius, *Japan and China*, (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1975), pg. 18.

and the right to develop manufacturing on Chinese soil. A most demoralizing blow came from the fact that Japan had no fear of the Celestial Kingdom and defeated the Chinese. At the end of the nineteenth century, no country thought of China, in political terms, as the "Middle Kingdom." The initial Chinese reaction was to blame their own inept Manchu government for Chinese failure. The Chinese marveled at Japan's sudden modernization but this admiration changed to animosity in the face of Japanese imperialism seeking to keep China weak. Admiral Ito addressed Admiral Ting of the Chinese forces after Japanese victory; "You are well aware how the Japanese Empire had to throw away the old system and adopt the new. Your country, also, must adopt this new way of living. If your country does this, all will be well, but if it rejects it, it cannot help but fall sooner or later."⁵ The Chinese began to question the traditional Confucian philosophy and were calling for assertive nationalism.⁶ It was Shimonoseki that convinced the Chinese that reform was necessary.

Shimonoseki brought the first great defeat of China at the hands of Japan and the loss of Korea; its most important tributary. The loss by China to what it considered an insignificant neighbor which was recently dominated by Western imperialists and was now an imperialist itself. Following the treaty, the European powers, Russia, Germany, and France, recommended that Japan return the Liaotung Peninsula in south Manchuria. Despite its military achievement, Japan was not accepted and was not considered a challenge to this circle of military powers. This Triple Intervention of 1895 caused bitterness among the Japanese who felt a great injustice had been done in its forfeiting territory. Appeals to Britain and the United States for support were refuted. Japan quickly lost confidence in international law and order as the Germans seized Shantung, the French gained ground in South China, and the Russians leased the Liaotung Peninsula, challenging Japanese authority in Korea. In the Japanese eyes, international law and treaties would not bring full respect and equality from the West. This strengthened Japanese nationalism.

⁵ Ibid., pg. 9.

⁶ Pye, Lucian, *China An Introduction*, 1991, pg. 121.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was instrumental in the relations between the two states and in China's relations with the world. Military defeat at the hands of the Japanese, a people the Chinese had viewed as inferior could not be accepted by the Chinese elite. The smaller Japan, culturally indebted to China for Confucianism and Buddhism, defeated the larger and culturally "superior" Chinese Empire. This defeat, symbolized the most prominent of external threats that threatened the survival of China. Chinese students flowed to Japan to seek the answers to modernization and the government sought to borrow from the Japanese model in the same direction as the Meiji leaders.⁷ Prior to the war, Japan's security self consciousness reflected its feeling of being vulnerable to the Western powers. The Japanese were unsure of their self image and conscious of their cultural indebtedness to China. The results of the war led to the superiority of the Japanese military and foreign tolerance for its role as a player in the realm of imperialism. Japanese attitudes changed as respect for China became contempt. The time was right for national self-congratulations in Japan. Japan had proved the strength of her military and there was a deep feeling of satisfaction that Japan had become a world power.

From approximately 1895 to the Treaty of Versailles (1919), Chinese and other Asian nationalists traveled to Japan to learn modern scientific culture and political ideas. Japan, having achieved the industrial underpinnings of Great Power status, joined the imperialists. Prior to World War One Japan gave considerable aid and assistance to Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen. Equally important, Japan provided the climate for the education of revolutionary leaders. Such terms as anarchism, socialism, communism, and nationalism are derived in Chinese from Japanese renderings of these European words. By 1911, there were 15,000 Chinese students in Japan.

By the last decade of the nineteenth century it appeared that China, like Africa, might be carved up by imperial powers. Parts of the country became the spheres of influence of different powers. Russia dominated Manchuria, especially after 1896 when it obtained the rights to build the Chinese Eastern Railroad. In 1898, Russia obtained a

⁷ Scalapino, Robert, A., *China and Japan*, ed. Alvin Coox and Hilary Conroy, 1978, pg. xvi.

twenty-five year lease for a base at Dairen and Port Arthur. Great Britain demanded a lease at Weihaiwei, a seaport in Shandong to counter the Russian advance. In the same year, Germany obtained a ninety-nine year lease on the tip of Shandong and France got a ninety-nine year lease of the Bay of Guanzhou in southwest Guangdong. The Boxer Rebellion, a xenophobic nationalistic movement, made the West think twice about dividing China into protectorates.

2. The Boxer Rebellion

The 1900 Boxer rebellion was a local reaction to the disruptions of the foreigners in China. Originally, the Boxers were not anti-foreign. They focused their animosity on famine conditions and the overthrow of the Manchu government. The government watched their activities closely and the combination of timing and conditions allowed the government to use the Boxers in a “defensive nationalism” movement to resist further influence from outside powers. The numerous problems in China were enough to stir up xenophobic sentiments. During 1898-1899, anti-foreign incidents became more overt and the Boxers began to recruit followers, adopting the slogan, “Uphold the Ch’ing, exterminate the foreigners.”⁸ As the Boxers became increasingly more supportive of the dynasty and the foreign powers more intrusive, the dynasty supported them. The Boxer Rebellion culminated in the occupation of the foreign legations in Peking. These legations were liberated by an international contingent of foreign troops consisting of mainly British, American, Japanese, and Russian soldiers, with representations from the German, French, Italian, and Austrian armies. The murder of a Japanese diplomat drew Japan into the relief effort. Prime Minister Yamagata waited until they were pressed by the European powers before committing Japanese troops. Any rapid advancement of troops would appear as a self-interest in China and stimulate reminders of 1895.

3. Japan’s Twenty-one Demands

The Twenty-one Demands were Japan’s solution to their China problem following the outbreak of the First World War which cast an even darker shadow on the relationship with China. Japan’s progression from the Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915 to the

⁸ Jansen, Marius, *Japan and China*, 1975, pg. 42.

seizure of Manchuria in 1931 ultimately filled the Chinese nationalists with hatred for Japan, which was exercising imperialism against its fellow Asians. Taking advantage of the European powers occupation with the war in Europe, Japan sought out a secure position in China safeguarding its position in East Asia. At the time, the Japanese government seemed to want it both ways. The Japanese needed to maintain ties with the modernized world of which the United States was its largest trading partner, but establish some special relationship with China. Japan's security could only be secured through alliance with Western countries, however, Sun Yat-sen wanted a promise between Japan and China that neither would ally with other powers. Japan had an interest in Fukien, South Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia, and the opportunity arose for Japan to strengthen its position in these territories. The majority in Japan felt that Japan should establish a paramount position in China. To them a paramount position meant a controlling voice in China's domestic and foreign affairs.⁹

The Twenty-one Demands were issued by senior government officials whose main concern was the territorial integrity of China. Minister Hioki presented the demands to Yuan Shih-k'ai personally. The demands were in five groups, the first concerning the Shantung province. All of imperial Germany's rights were to be transferred to Japan. The second group extended the lease and privileges in south Manchuria which the Japanese gained from Russia in 1905. The third group established the pattern of joint administration of the Hanyehp'ing Company. In the fourth group, China had to promise not to alienate any port along the China coast to any other country. Seven demands that were the "desires of the Imperial Japanese Government" and kept secret from other countries composed the fifth group. This group specified that the Japanese would be employed as political, financial, and military advisers to China; Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools would be allowed to own land in China; Japanese would be appointed to police positions; China would purchase Japanese arms; Japan would be allowed to construct railways connecting the Yangtze Valley with the

⁹ Chi, Madeleine, *China Diplomacy 1914-1918*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pg. 28.

south China coast; Japanese capital would be given priority for the development of Fukien province; and Japanese would be permitted to do mission work in China.¹⁰

Japan saw the demands as a way of preventing future misunderstandings between the two nations. China saw them as a sly way of taking advantage of a weaker neighbor in the face of a world war. China's acceptance of the demands would be proof of China's friendship and any refusal would call for vigorous measures on the part of Japan. Yuan refused immediate comment on the demands. China's delaying tactic brought Japanese troops into Manchuria indicating that Japan would resort to other means of diplomacy if China did not make the important concessions. The signing of the agreement on 10 May 1915, excluding group five requests, brought the boycott of Japanese goods and an exodus of revolutionaries from Japan. Animosity rose in the Chinese people and Chinese students and merchants warned the government that any surrender to Japan would make China a second Korea. May 7, the date which Japan issued the ultimatum, became National Humiliation Day on which students paraded the streets denouncing Japanese aggression. The Japanese demands strengthened Chinese nationalism against Japanese imperialism. In turn, pride in Japanese achievement and confidence in the future progress of the nation characterized Japanese nationalism.

4. The Manchurian Incident

Chinese animosity to Japan grew from Japan's Twenty-one demands in 1915 to its invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Japan was no longer Asian in Chinese eyes, but imperialist. Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905, fostered a feeling of national pride in Japan. To the Japanese, Japan had gained international status like no other East Asian country and posed a challenge to the domination of the West. From 1922-1931 there was a growing sense of ultra-nationalism under strong military and economic pressures. Patriotism and duty marked the focus of the Japanese educational system to develop efficient and obedient citizens loyal to a strong state. The Imperial Rescript on Education was read to school children from 1890-1945:

Our imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects,

¹⁰ Jansen, Marius, *Japan and China*, 1975, pg. 214.

ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of our education. You, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husband and wives be harmonious, as friends true, bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop your intellectual faculties and perfect your moral powers; ...advance the public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should any emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne, coequal with heaven and earth.¹¹

In the summer of 1927, Prime Minister Baron Giichi Tanaka gave a summary of a foreign affairs conference in Tokyo to the Emperor. The Tanaka Memorial was denounced by Japan as a forgery but printed by the Chinese in 1929 as evidence of Japanese nationalistic ambitions. Regarding Manchuria and Mongolia the Memorial stated:

The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone; its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivaled elsewhere in the world. In order to exploit these resources for the perpetration of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchurian Railway Company.¹²

Regarding foreign relations:

Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts the policy of "Blood and Iron...." In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.¹³

¹¹ Kennedy, J, *Asian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1968), pg. 125.

¹² *The China Critic* Vol. IV, 1931, pg. 923-924, in *The Dynamics of Nationalism*, ed. Louis L. Snyder, (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1964), pg 326.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pg. 326.

Focusing on trade with China:

A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. Even during these years of internal strife, they can still toil patiently, and try to imitate and displace our goods so as to impair the development of our trade....We must beware lest one day China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous.¹⁴

Chiang Kai-shek was in control of the National Government of the Republic of China and by 1928 was firmly established in Nanking. Their movement north, to reclaim Manchuria, provoked stronger resistance from the Japanese Kwantung Army as friction increased. In the summer of 1931, a Japanese army captain was shot in Mongolia by a detail of Manchurian army soldiers. This aroused the Japanese military and public. The Kwantung army took matters into their own hands. The staff officers, Ishiwara and Itagaki, implemented a plan for the further conquest of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. They sponsored anti-Japanese sentiment and staged a bombing along the South Manchurian Railway, near Mukden, to order troops into action. Because the Kwantung Army was vastly superior compared to the Chinese Manchurian forces, they manufactured a crises to obtain support from troops in Korea. The army and Tokyo created a new state of Manchukuo and assumed responsibility for foreign affairs, defense, communications, and transportation. The Kwantung Army would be the authority with the commander as the ambassador and governor. The coup by the Japanese army and the occupation of every important center in Manchuria was achieved by the Kwantung army without the approval of the Emperor and the majority in the cabinet.¹⁵

The loss of Manchuria by the Chinese Nationalists meant a loss of customs and tariffs to the Kuomintang government. It also prevented the internal unity of the northern provinces that the Kuomintang considered necessary for reform. The seizing of Manchuria ultimately filled the nationalists with a hatred for Japan and a sentiment of

¹⁴ Ibid., pg. 327.

¹⁵ Jansen, Marius, *Japan and China*, 1975, pg. 380-382, and Storry, Richard, *The Double Patriots*, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1973), pg. 77-80.

betrayal of fellow Asians by an imperialist Japan. There was no doubt that Manchuria remained important to Japan. The Japanese argued that its aggression was justified on the basis of "rice defense." The Manchurian incident marked the point at which Japan followed the trail that led to the Second World War. Following this incident, extreme nationalism was no longer a minority movement in Japan, but nationalistic organizations joined forces and became a national movement with the support of the public. Japan had become more concerned with the strength of the nation and as the militarists came to power, its nationalism became more aggressive.

5. The Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945

Three elements, loyalty to the throne, sense of mission, and belief in the possession of superlative inborn qualities, constituted the essential national character or polity of modern Japan. Known as *kokutai*, the national polity or national entity was the foundation of the Japanese state.¹⁶ After the Manchurian Incident, a resurgence in the ultra-nationalist societies sprang up. The use of militarism was advocated by the "double patriots" as a means of defense against those forces that obstruct the ideals of Japan. Japan should seize the territories that were necessary for her livelihood and had the right to share in the profits of the great capitalist powers. Even moderate politicians and intellectuals supported the war effort, however, for a distinct separate reason from the militarists. To many, a war with China would be freeing China from the unequal treaties which subverted Chinese sovereignty and made it a puppet of the Western powers. Japan's primary mission was to lead the fight against "white imperialism" thus becoming not only diplomatically and militarily equal but morally justified in liberating the East from the West. Japan's mission, therefore, was more than survival but as the moral leader for Asians. The war with China and later in the Pacific, to liberate these nations from the "white imperialists," became a global conflict from which would emerge a new world order. The Japanese called the war "the war of Greater East Asia." Some intellectuals explained the war in terms of serving the progress of mankind, not just the

¹⁶ Storry, Richard, *The Double Patriots*, 1973, pg. 5.

glory or security of Japan. The war would establish Japan on a superior moral basis to the West by "liberating Asia by going to war with it."¹⁷

The Chinese Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, had gained a stronghold in Nanking and had established a government on the basis of the Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. The first and most important principle was nationalism. Sun Yat-sen emphasized the extent to which China had been victimized by imperialism and the unequal treaties. Democracy was the second principle. China's people needed greater unity and authority. Government should be divided into five branches; the executive, legislative, the judicial, the civil examination system and the Censorate. Unlike the prevailing Western view of democracy, China would undergo a period of "political tutelage" before achieving complete democracy. People's livelihood was the third principle. Government would buy back property from landlords for land reform and issue a single tax on land. The Kuomintang achieved some national unity in the face of an international crisis with Japan but was ineffectual in reforming China's structure. In 1936, Chiang was able to secure an agreement with the Communists to lead a national resistance against any further Japanese demands or expansion.¹⁸

When the defeat of China proved not to be a short term involvement, Prince Konoe announced in 1938, the New Order in East Asia as a world mission for Japan. Japan would construct a region in which imperialism would not advance and the mutual development of Asia would prevail. This new order would be capable of standing against Western capitalism and Soviet communism. Japan sought to return China to East Asia and Konoe declared that "what Japan desires is the establishment of such a new order as to assure stability in East Asia in perpetuity."¹⁹ Thus, officials promoted the war in China as a struggle against imperialism which gave it an ethical foundation. Conversely,

¹⁷ Duus, Peter, "Nagai Ryutaro and the 'White Peril,' 1905-1944," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXI, no. 1, November 1971.

¹⁸ Pye, Lucian, *China, An Introduction*, (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), pg 145-148.

¹⁹ Miwa, Kimitada, "Japanese Policies and Concepts for a Regional Order in Asia, 1938-1940," in *The Ambivalence of Nationalism*, ed. James W. White, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1990), pg . 143.

Chiang Kai-shek wrote, "This policy was merely a catch-all designation for Japan's plan to overturn the international order in East Asia, enslave China, establish hegemony over the entire Pacific region, and conquer the world."²⁰ Southeast Asia's resources were essential for Japan's war efforts. As early as August 1940, Japan had begun its transformation into an extended economic region. Prime Minister Matsuoka stated:

...It is the national mission of Japan to propagate to the world the way of the Tenno, the Emperor of Japan....The way of the Tenno is nothing but to allow every nation and every people to enjoy what is due to them. In other words, as applied to the present foreign policy of our country, it means nothing more than establishing a greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere by linking Japan, Manchukuo and China together as a first step starting from this great spirit of the Imperial Way.²¹

In 1941, the Japanese moved against China's Western allies in Southeast Asia, encompassing these countries in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This vision was to construct an area where members would enjoy independence under Japanese protection. Furthermore, this region would be free of capitalist imperialism that had previously ruled the area. Japan attempted to prove that the war was not over territory by granting the Burmese and Filipinos political independence. The mission to fight to free Asian peoples from the domination and exploitation of Western nations gave Japanese nationalism a moral characteristic. Despite this rhetoric, the Imperial Army was not the greatest representation of this idealism and many Japanese entrepreneurs were anxious to use the new regions for financial gain.

As Chinese unity grew, Japan decided to accelerate its China policy. In 1937, at Marco Polo Bridge, the Japanese attacked Chinese units. Japan was successful in defeating the Chinese and proceeded to Nanking. Prior to the Japanese approach to Nanking, forces from both sides had fought a bloody battle in Shanghai with 40,000 Japanese and 250,000 Chinese casualties. 300,000 civilians had been killed as the Japanese advanced on Nanking, driving the Kuomintang to the western province of

²⁰ Hashikawa, Bunso, "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosperity," in *The Chinese and the Japanese*, ed. Akira Iriye, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pg. 349.

²¹ Ibid., pg. 150.

Chungking.²² Prior to Japanese occupation, the Japanese commander offered peaceful assimilation to those who were noncombatants. However, Japanese soldiers looted every building and torched large parts of the city. The Japanese army decided to take no prisoners and the search for Chinese deserters resulted in thousands of deaths, many innocent civilians. Over 20,000 women were raped during the first month of the occupation and during the first three days 12,000 civilians and over 30,000 troops were massacred.²³ These atrocities were not unique to Nanking. Many women were raped, villages burned, and men used for bayonet practice throughout the course of the war. Despite the powerful Japanese army, the Chinese forces were not destroyed. The horrors of Japanese atrocities in Nanking united the Chinese in strong resistance to the Japanese advance. The Communists established themselves in northern China as elusive guerrilla units. In efforts to rid the countryside of Communists, the Japanese practiced "purification drives" that brought the war and nationalism to the unsuspecting peasants. The reform tactics of the Japanese to "burn and kill everything" resulted in a massive destruction campaign leaving once rich fields as scorched deserts. This tactic drove the Chinese countryside into war against the foreign terror.²⁴ The well trained and disciplined Red Army was welcomed by the rural community compared to brutality of the Japanese forces. Therefore, the brutal behavior of the Japanese forces contributed to the stimulation of Chinese nationalism. As early as 1936 Peking students warned:

Listen to what we say: we have seen those things flying overhead every day. Those things are called airplanes. Sitting in them are the devils of the East Sea, the Japanese devils. They speak a foreign tongue, live in the Eastern Sea, and fly their airplanes over here! Do you know what they are coming to do?... They are coming to kill every single man and woman with their guns and knives, and to ravish our daughters and wives....²⁵

²² Eastman, Lloyd, "Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets, and Atrocities During the War, 1937-1945," in *The Chinese and the Japanese*, ed. Akira Iriye, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pg. 293.

²³ Ibid., pg. 295. At the war crimes trial in Nanking the figure was fixed at 300,000.

²⁴ Jansen, Marius, *Japan and China*, 1975, pg. 433.

²⁵ Ibid., pg. 433.

This warning became reality for many Chinese in the years to follow. As the Japanese sought to persecute the Communists, they drove out the Kuomintang but left the region open to the Red Army. The Communists had appealed to the people's nationalism throughout the war years. The Communists were successful at mobilizing the people against the Japanese aggressors. One could influence the fate of his country by helping the guerrillas and becoming a loyal citizen in the Communist occupied territories. At the conclusion of the war, the victory for China was short lived as the internal struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists enveloped the country.

B. CHINA'S COLD WAR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Throughout the Cold War relations between Japan and China were dependent on the policies of the superpowers around them. Although economic relations continued throughout the Cold War, official diplomatic relations were shadowed by the complex international environment. Japan, fearful of Communist expansion, was dependent on United States security and followed the American example for dealing with the PRC. China, faced with what it considered to be "hostile imperialist powers," sought Soviet assistance to preserve its security. As diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States changed, PRC-Japan relations mirrored the two superpowers. It was not until the PRC determined an independent foreign policy against regional hegemony that nationalism resurfaced.

1. Antagonism 1945-1972

During the postwar years, Japan became inward oriented under the occupation of the United States. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty, all led to a further estrangement with China. The Korean War marked a battle of the superpowers in which China was determined to prevent this strategic peninsula from falling into the hands of a hostile power. In 1950, China sided with the Soviet Union in an effort to fight off containment by the "imperialists." The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950 jointly prevented "the revival of Japanese imperialism and repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may join in any way with Japan in acts of

aggression.”²⁶ The Korean War emphasized the seriousness of the Communist threat to Japan. To Japanese decision makers, the Soviet Union was an expansionist threat to which China had been added. Despite efforts to establish a “two China” policy, an unarmed Japan had no choice but to seek protection from the United States against any external threats. At the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, Japan, dependent on the United States’ nuclear umbrella, reluctantly recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan under United States pressure. Moreover, Japan’s political and economic future was dependent on close ties to the United States. Therefore, United States policy towards China was the determinant of Sino-Japanese relations during this period.

Sino-Japanese trade between 1949-1953 was relatively insignificant. The majority of Japanese trade flowed to Taiwan and American procurements for the Korean War led to economic advancements for Japan. At the end of the Korean War, a series of unofficial trade agreements in 1952, 1953, and 1955 between Japan and China were signed as tensions subsided. China sponsored “peoples diplomacy” in an effort to restore diplomatic relations with Japan. Japanese Socialists and Communists encouraged the exchange of organizations friendly towards China and organized a number of programs aimed at promoting Sino-Japanese cooperation and friendship. Trade in 1952 was at an all time low, consisting of only .7 percent of Japanese total imports and .1 percent of its total exports. Trade increased up to 1958, but never exceeded three percent of Japanese total exports and imports.²⁷ Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s visit to Taipei in 1957 symbolized the strong anti-Communist characteristic of Japan’s foreign policy. When a Japanese citizen pulled down the Chinese flag at a trade exhibition in Nagasaki in 1958, the Chinese government demanded an official apology. Japan’s refusal to apologize for the incident following the recent Prime Minister’s visit was enough to sever all relations between China and Japan.

²⁶ Jain, R, *China and Japan 1949-1976*, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), pg. 6.

²⁷ Mendl, Wolf, *Issues in Japan’s China Policy*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), pg. 29.

In 1958, China launched an aggressive drive against the renewal of the United States-Japan security treaty. According to the PRC this treaty was an obstruction to Sino-Japanese relations and promoted instability in East Asia. By ratifying this treaty, Japan was attempting to revive Japanese militarism with the support of the imperialist military bloc of the United States. The PRC argued that this treaty threatened not only China but all of the East Asian countries that had witnessed Japanese aggression in the past. Mao, in 1960, described the new security treaty "as an aggressive military alliance treaty hostile to China and the Soviet Union and to the Asian peoples."²⁸ Despite the political rhetoric, trade continued between the two countries primarily due to the growing Sino-Soviet split that had increased the PRC's economic difficulties. The two tier system of trade, Memorandum Trade and Friendly Trade, dominated Sino-Japanese economic relations until 1972. Not signed by government officials, both trade agreements were intended to channel inter-governmental relations. Friendly trade was described as private economic contracts established on an individual basis essential for the two countries. Originally, fifty Japanese companies were recognized as willing to do business with the PRC. Memorandum Trade was based on contacts with Japanese conservatives willing to expand trade. These contacts resulted in a five year trade agreement, (1963-1967), which sought to provide one billion dollars in total trade.

Eisaku Sato, more conservative and anti-Communist than his predecessor, came to power as Prime Minister in 1964. Sato continued to support the United States' policy of containment against China. By favoring Japanese policy towards Taiwan, Sato fueled greater hostility from the PRC on the verge of its Cultural Revolution. Japanese normalization with South Korea in 1965, coupled with a rise in defense expenditures led to Chinese apprehension over a revival of militarism through a "Northeast Asia military alliance." Japan's treaty with South Korea indicated that the imperialist powers were forming a "Northeast Asia military alliance" to attack the DPRK, blocking the reunification of the peninsula, and then proceeding into the PRC. Chinese security apprehension did not halt trade relations between the two nations. Economic exchanges

²⁸ Jain, R, *China and Japan 1949-1976*, 1977, pg. 43.

continued to 1965 making Japan China's number one trading partner.²⁹ However, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution negated any hopes of stronger ties between the two nations. During these three years, Japan decided to observe China carefully rather than form any new policy. Taiwan became even more of an issue when Sato identified Japanese security issues with the preservation of the ROC. Sato's visit to Taiwan, in 1967, was seen as an act of aggression by the PRC. Japan-ROC ties were aiding the imperialist United States and revisionist Soviet Union to encircle China. Trade during the Cultural Revolution continued but to a lesser degree. The PRC's self-reliance policy imposed the political requirement of universal recognition and emulation of Mao's thought on all countries dealing with the PRC. As a result of this revolution the JCP lost confidence with the Chinese Communists and dissolved the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association. Friendship trade continued, however, under the Chinese sponsored Japan International Trade Promotion Association. Memorandum Trade was reduced and renewed on an annual basis in 1967.

An uncertain regional environment, nuclear tests, increasing Sino-Soviet disputes, the Vietnam War, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, created difficulties in normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. In 1969, at the National Press Club in Washington and in the Joint Communiqué with President Nixon, Premier Sato stated that if "an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would seriously be affected." Furthermore, "the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for our own security." Therefore, Japan would do all it could to support the United States in its defense obligation for peace and stability in East Asia. Moreover, Sato declared that he hoped that China's policies would promote international peace and that Japan and the U.S. "should always keep their doors open towards Communist China."³⁰ Although stated in 1969, Japan's policy throughout this period was aimed at keeping as many options open as possible concerning China. The recurring Taiwan issue was the best means of accommodating two Chinas. Japan's fear of communism, first the

²⁹ Lee, Chae-Jin, *Japan Faces China*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pg. 187.

³⁰ Joint Communiqué by US President Richard M. Nixon and Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato, 21 November 1969, cited in *China and Japan, 1949-1976*, R. Jain, 1977, pg. 259

Soviet Union and then the uncertainty over a radical PRC, strengthened Japan's association with the United States. The Japanese government did not want to be tied too closely to the United States, therefore, trade continued in various degrees. A non-committal foreign policy protected the government from domestic pressures as well as secured the protection of the United States. Despite Japanese attempts at remaining non-committal, Japan followed the United States' lead regarding political and strategic issues focusing on the PRC.

2. Normalization with Japan

Following the United States' normalization with the PRC in February 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka broke relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan and recognized the People's Republic of China in September. This established diplomatic relations for the first time in over thirty years. Formal treaties of peace, trade, navigation, fishing and air travel were undertaken. Following a series of top level summit meetings, a joint statement concerning the diplomatic relations between China and Japan was issued by Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Tanaka:

We should not forever linger in the dim blind alley of the past. In my opinion, it is important now for the leaders of Japan and China to confer in the interest of tomorrow...despite the fact that some minor differences exist between the positions and views of the two sides, I believe it is possible for Japan and China to overcome their divergence of views and reach agreement in the spirit of seeking common ground on major questions and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.³¹

Furthermore, the Japanese stated that it "reproached" itself for damages caused during the war. Six years later, after intense negotiations, The Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in August, 1978. The major issue regarding this treaty focused on the anti-hegemony clause, emphasizing a joint opposition to any country seeking hegemony in Asia. China, at the time, was referring to the Soviet Union. Japan hoped for a territorial settlement with the Soviet Union regarding the four islands of the Kuriles but as relations between Japan and the Soviets cooled over the Kurile islands, Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 indicating that "neither of the two countries should seek

³¹ Lee, Chae-Jin, *Japan Faces China*, 1976, pg. 122.

hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” However, a separate article stated that the treaty “would not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.”³² The deteriorating Japanese-Soviet relations was a catalyst in the normalization with China, yet the Japanese did not want to create an anti-Soviet appearance by the agreement. There were several additional points that were agreed upon in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.³³

- The abnormal state of affairs that existed between the People’s Republic of China and Japan was declared terminated.
- Japan recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China.
- The Government of the PRC reaffirmed that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory of the PRC and the Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand.
- The Government of the PRC renounced its demand for war indemnities from Japan.
- Both sides agreed to establish peaceful and friendly relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and to settle all disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

The treaty was beneficial to both parties involved. China was content with the anti-hegemony clause which it intended to use against any future Soviet influence. Japan proclaimed that its diplomacy had expanded globally by signing the treaty. Japanese leaders felt Japan had taken an assertive and confident step in the direction of international responsibility to match the country’s economic power.

Following the death of Mao Zedong, China pursued industrialization under Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations program. Contrary to Mao’s policy enforcing self-reliance, China was willing to borrow technology and capital from the West to promote

³² Kim, Hong Nack, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Post Mao Era,” *Korea and World Affairs*, 8, no. 3, 1984, pg. 517-518.

³³ Joint Statement of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, September 29, 1972, in *Japan Faces China*, Chae-Jin Lee, 1976, pg. 211.

China as a future global force. China was depending, and remains significantly dependent, on Japanese capital and industrial materials for its modernization. Japanese businessmen also saw a primary opportunity for suffering chemical, shipbuilding, steel and textile industries.

February 1978 marked the opening of a new era in trade relations between Japan and China. A new trade agreement would provide 20 billion dollars in two way trade between 1978-1986. Japan would increase its oil imports from China while China would seek imports of industrial equipment and construction material. China also requested 10 billion dollars in bank loans and 5.5 billion dollars for construction of modernization projects.³⁴ China was eager to attract high quality technology for its modernization program. In 1981-1985, China planned to renovate key factories which would be placed under Japanese supervision for renovation.

After the signing of the peace treaty, Deng Xiaoping expressed his support for the continuation of the U.S.-Japan treaty as well as endorsed the right of Japan to increase its self defense forces.³⁵ Wu Xiuquan, deputy chief of staff of the PLA, elaborated on Deng's statement: "I am all for Japan's increasing its self defense capabilities....Generally speaking, Japan is one of the economic powers and it is entitled to become a big power militarily too...."³⁶ Both Japan and China feared any Soviet military buildup stating disapproval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979-80, as well as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979. China's preoccupation with Soviet hegemony played a large role in its policy regarding the increase in Japanese military expenditures. Despite the positive trade relationship that developed and the lack of concern for military capabilities, Sino-Japanese relations were weakened over the 1982 textbook incident. The Japanese Ministry of Education revised highschool textbooks concerning Japanese activities in Korea and China before and during the Second World

³⁴ Kim, Hong Nack, "Sino Japanese Relations in the Post-Mao Era," 1984, pg. 516, 520.

³⁵ Ibid., pg. 525, from *Asahi Shimbun*, October 24, 1978.

³⁶ Manning, Robert, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," *The Washington Quarterly*, 17, no. 1, 1994, pg. 53.

War. Particularly, these textbooks downplayed the Japanese role in the Nanking incident in 1937. The revision of the textbooks was held by China as a possible revival of a militaristic Japan. China and Korea viewed the issue as an insult to their respective countries seriously impairing their relations with Japan.

1982 marked a change in China's foreign policy regarding Japan and the rest of the world. China sought an "independent foreign policy" with the Soviet Union as well as the United States in an effort to boost its Four Modernizations program. China sought to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union or be faced with massive military defense expenditures thus reducing the success of its development programs. Japan's rearmament, therefore, was no longer seen as a balance against the Soviet threat. China became more assertive regarding Japan's defense policy fearing Japanese militarization would lead to further tension in the region. Prime Minister Nakasone led a more nationalistic Japanese foreign policy as Japan sought a greater position as a regional and global power. His views on defending Japan would make "Japan 'an unsinkable aircraft carrier' and bottling up the Soviet naval vessels in the Sea of Japan by blocking the four straits leading to the Pacific Ocean."³⁷ By the mid 1980s, China was heavily dependent on Japanese economic aid. Beijing cooled its criticism of Japanese defense policy as relations with the Soviet Union failed to improve. The Soviet Union refused to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, reduce troops along the Sino-Soviet border, and terminate aid to the Vietnamese in Cambodia. During a visit by General Party Secretary Hu Yaobang to Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone relieved Chinese apprehension over Japanese defense spending reaffirming its adherence to Japan's Constitution. Hu emphasized China's need for economic, technical, and scientific assistance as well as a six billion dollar loan package for Chinese modernization. Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Beijing, in 1984, secured a two billion dollar aid package for China as well as the inauguration of the "21st Century Committee for Sino-Japanese Friendship." By mid 1985, China sold one quarter of its exports on the Japanese market and purchased one third of its imports from Japan.³⁸

³⁷ Kim, Hong Nack, "Sino Japanese Relations in the Post-Mao Era," 1984, pg. 533.

³⁸ Harding, Harry, *China and Northeast Asia, The Political Dimension*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), pg 28.

Both countries viewed the Soviet Union as the primary threat to their security with its military buildup in Asia.

Improvement in Sino-Japanese relations following normalization was clearly a result of the economic interests of both countries. China was highly dependent on Japanese financial aid and technological assistance to meet Deng's Four Modernizations program. Japan could provide high quality technology and capital and China provided Japan with raw materials and oil. The increase in trade between the two countries led to greater economic cooperation in manufacturing and industry. This was all done under the concern of Soviet hegemony in the region. China endorsed the United States-Japan Security treaty as well as the increase in Japanese self defense capabilities. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, nationalisms in both countries have reasserted themselves regarding the role each country should play in the region.

C. CHINA'S POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

When current relations are discussed it is necessary to remember the historical foundations that they are based on. As previously discussed, China past through centuries as a great power and as the center of international order, therefore, China was all the more humiliated by her defeats. Japan played a large role in the century of "shame and humiliation." Because of this past, China is eager to regain its status that is equivalent to its size, population, and heritage. China's foreign policy reflects the motivation to regain China's position as a great power. The resurgence of nationalism will motivate the people for the same goal. Nationalism is that which provides the people with pride as equals or superiors to those of other powers. China will not be content as a status quo power and will utilize nationalism to reassert its role in the region as well as the international system. Japan's position over the last century was characterized by its inability to find a place in the international system. Despite its modernization of the Meiji period, Japan struggled to find a place in Asia or with the West. Japan in its attempt to return to East Asia was under the concept of a New World Order, to liberate Asian countries from imperialism. The Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere was the means of shaping the international system under the Way of the Emperor. The war with China resulted not only from

Japanese frustration and contempt for a country which contributed its early cultural influence, but from Japan's arrogant ambition to free China from Western influence and instill "superior" Japanese ideals. Japan, similar to its period of ultra-nationalism, seeks to find a place in the international system equivalent to its economic power. Japan's quest for power parity will reflect nationalistic policies in which a nationalistic China will play a large role.

1. Current Relations

Throughout the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, Sino-Japanese relations have remained unsettled despite mutual concerns for economic development. Chinese nationalism reasserted itself as the Chinese leadership squared off with the Japanese over issues concerning Japan's defense spending, Sino-Japanese trade deficits, uncertainties in Taiwan relations, and Japanese apology for conduct during the Second World War. Tension increased between China and Japan as Chinese nationalism surfaced in China's foreign policy approach. China decided on an independent foreign policy to avoid strategic dependence on the United States.³⁹ The beginning of this resurgence in nationalism was evident in 1982 when Hu Yaobang stated to the Twelfth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party;

Being patriots we do not tolerate any encroachment on China's national dignity or interests.... In the thirty-three years since the founding of our People's Republic, we have shown the world by deeds that China never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power.... Having suffered aggression and oppression for over a century, the Chinese people will never again allow themselves to be humiliated as they were before, nor will they subject other nations to such humiliation.⁴⁰

The cordial relationship between the two nations stood on fragile ground in 1987. Prime Minister Nakasone declared that Japan would increase its defense spending to greater than one percent of its GDP. China felt that this was a sign of future Japanese

³⁹ Japan is also becoming more nationalistic and resenting dependence on the United States.

⁴⁰ Whiting, Allen, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, XXIII, no. 8, August, 1983, pg. 913.

nationalism. Chinese suspicions were strengthened with Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, commemorating Japanese war criminals as well as officers and soldiers. This action, in the wake of the textbook incident downplaying Japanese atrocities in World War Two, concerned Chinese officials. This rise in Japanese nationalism was one obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations.

Economic interdependence between the two countries has generated tension over the last decade. Since 1983, China has experienced large trade deficits with Japan due to the large surge of Chinese imports and the restrictions on access to Japanese markets which make it difficult to maintain the rate of exports to the rate of imports. These issues led to a series of anti-Japanese protests by Chinese students in 1985 warning the public of a second Japanese invasion and the revival of Japanese militarism. Trade between the two states has grown from 17 billion dollars in 1990 to 40 billion dollars in 1994. Japanese investment reached 1 billion and Japanese Official Development Assistance accounted for one half of all assistance to China. Japan also became China's number one trading partner while China is Japan's second.⁴¹ In 1994, China experienced a 12% real growth rate for the third consecutive year and became the largest shoe and steel producer in the world. World Bank projections indicate that China's net imports will reach 639 billion in 2002 compared to 521 billion for Japan. Its GDP will reach 9.8 trillion dollars compared to the United States' 9.7 trillion. This would make it the largest economic entity in the world.⁴² Its impressive economic growth potential is a concern for Japan's business sector. Clearly, Sino-Japanese relations are driven by economic concerns. However, China is well aware of Japanese business intentions. More recently, economic tensions have cooled as Japan has accepted Chinese import controls and the integration of Chinese firms in the production structure. Most Japanese economic activity has occurred in resource rich Manchuria which has great historical and geographical significance for the two countries.

⁴¹ Wang, Dajun, "Creating New Vistas for Sino-Japanese Cooperation," *Beijing Review*, March 21-27, 1994, Manning, Robert, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," 1994, pg. 53.

⁴² Kristof, Nicholas, "The Rise of China," *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 5, 1993, pg. 61.

Taiwan remains a sore spot in Sino-Japanese relations. In 1985 a group of LDP politicians participated in a ceremony in Taipei commemorating the birth of Chiang Kai-shek. China was successful in forcing Japan into withdrawing its invitation to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to the Hiroshima games. However, vice-president Hsu Li-teh attended becoming the highest ranking official to visit Japan since the 1972 collapse of formal Tokyo-Taipei relations. Following this meeting, Taiwan's economic minister met with his Japanese counterpart. During the 10th session of the 21st Century Committee for China-Japan Friendship, in February 1995, Premier Li Peng stated that in order to maintain a healthy development of the relations between the two countries, the two nations should follow the Sino-Japanese Joint Declarations, he said of Japan, "it should handle its relations with Taiwan in line with the 'one China' principle and guard against the passive tendency of a handful of people." Japan's chief representative on the committee Tadao Ishikawa, stated that Japan will abide by the agreements reached by the two countries concerning relations with Taiwan.⁴³ Prime Minister Murayama in his meeting with Premier Li Peng in May 1995, stated that Japan would limit its contact with Taiwan to nongovernmental activities in accordance with the 1972 joint declaration and will not adopt a "two China" policy. Japan maintains economic ties with Taiwan, as well as air transport and financial connections.

Regarding its aggression during the Second World War, in June 1995, Japan's parliament passed a resolution expressing remorse for causing "unbearable pain to people abroad, particularly in Asian countries." Japan's parliament had been discussing whether to acknowledge having committed "acts of aggression" and "colonialism" and whether to offer an apology for such acts. They settled on remorse rather than an apology for actions during the war. Prior to this resolution, Prime Minister Murayama stated in his May meeting with Li Peng; "I recognize anew that Japan's actions at one time in our past history, including aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for many people in your country and other Asian neighbors.... I intend to make every effort to build world peace." Li Peng indicated that China and Japan should work together as

⁴³ "Sino-Japanese Friendship Committee Meeting Opens," FBIS, Beijing, February 14, 1995.

the new century approaches instead of remaining captive to the past.⁴⁴ This compromise solution is a political solution rather than a sincere apology for wartime atrocities that is unlikely to reassure Japan's Asian neighbors.

...polite expressions and apologies are normally directed at people of equal or greater status, not at someone lower on the social totem pole. So some scholars say the reluctance to apologize has to do with a conventional view that Chinese and Koreans are of lower status, making it demeaning for Japanese to apologize to them.⁴⁵

2. Post-Cold War Chinese National Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions

China's security issues concerning Japan must be placed in the larger context of economic development and overall national strategy. Chinese nationalism is no longer xenophobic nor does it indicate an irrational isolationist aspect in its foreign policy. Developing its national economy is the centerpiece of China's grand strategy for the remainder of this century and the beginning of the 21st century. Deng's theory of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is the guideline for economic reform. China is well aware that stable relations with its neighboring countries as well as stability at home is essential for its increased development. Currently, China is experiencing the best security environment since 1949. There is no real military threat from any adversary that may threaten China's security in the near future. However, China is concerned with any threats to its economic security which includes the protection and sovereignty over its territory. Deng Xiaoping declared, "Our greatest top priority is national sovereignty and security."⁴⁶ China seeks to open relations with other countries in the world so not to become solely dependent on Japan's assistance and trade. By finding economic cooperation internationally it will have a broader range to develop its national economy.

⁴⁴ Kajita, Takehiko, "Murayama reiterates Japan's remorse for wartime actions" Japan Economic Newswire, May 3, 1995.

⁴⁵ Kristof, Nicholas, "A Big Exception for a Nation of Apologizers," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1995 pg. A4.

⁴⁶ Xiajun, Xu, "China's Grand Strategy for the 21st Century," in *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, ed. Michael Bellows, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pg. 31.

Chinese officials proclaim that their nation is not expansionist nor seeking hegemony. Development is not possible unless there exists a peaceful and stable environment. China promotes the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the rule for foreign policy in the international world order: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in another's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and solution of all international issues by peaceful means.⁴⁷ The century of "shame and humiliation" is vivid in the minds of Chinese leaders who will use nationalism as a means to rally the people against any form of an external threat.

In the face of such massive economic assistance and cooperation, China maintains a grave concern over Japanese defense postures which could make Japan a political and security threat in the 21st century. Japan has continued to spend one percent of its GDP on defense, however, this has led to approximately 44 billion dollars in defense expenditures in 1994, growing at 3% a year, placing it second behind the United States. Moreover, Japan is seeking the acquisition of long range aircraft and naval combat ability to defend 1,000 nautical miles of sea lanes. The power projection capability of Japan is a threat to China's east coast security. A greater fear is a break with the United States and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. To the Chinese, any reduction of American forces would lead to a more independent and nationalistic Japan seeking offensive capability to assert its role in the region. Furthermore, a break from the U.S. security umbrella would enable Japan to establish a military force structure commensurate with its economic power. This would include the development of nuclear weapons.

China is also concerned with the recent deployment of Japanese forces to the Persian Gulf (1991), Cambodia (1992), and Mozambique (1993). Japan sent two support ships and four minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, a six hundred man engineering battalion to Cambodia, and fifty SDF personnel to Mozambique. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, realizing peace keeping operations by Japan were political rather than military, stated, "in some quarters of Asia there remains apprehensive about Japan's overseas military

⁴⁷ Ibid., pg. 40.

deployments.”⁴⁸ Some Chinese officials are concerned that an increase in Japanese forces overseas will lead to the revision of the law governing Japan’s Self Defense Forces. If Japan’s peacekeeping activities leads to the acquisition of long rang aircraft, amphibious assault ships, and defensive aircraft carriers, then a critical response from the PRC is guaranteed.

Japan’s seeking a position on the UN Security Council is another tense issue in Sino-Japanese security concerns. Such a seat would give Japan greater independence in its security policy as well as an indication of Japan’s attainment of a larger global role commensurate to its economic superiority. In the past, Japan has used the minimalist interpretation of its constitution to avoid international security commitments and domestic opinion that was set against a more active foreign policy. “Article 9 was used as a cover for a low-posture foreign policy that allowed the government to maintain domestic peace and pursue mercantilist policies abroad.”⁴⁹ Japan is the second largest financial contributor to UN funds but received a great deal of criticism for its “check book diplomacy” during the Persian Gulf War. In June 1992, the Japanese Diet authorized the use of Self Defense Forces to participate in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations. The legislation set five conditions for participation: a cease-fire agreement must exist; a Japanese role must be accepted by parties directly involved in conflicts; a UN force must be neutral; the Self-Defense Forces must be withdrawn once a truce collapses; and the personnel would be allowed to use arms only in self-defense.⁵⁰ This interpretation of the Japanese Constitution, in the shadow of international criticism, attempted to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to play a role in international security.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Manning, Robert, “Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future,” 1993, pg. 54.

⁴⁹ Pyle, Kenneth, “Japan and the Future of Collective Security,” in *Japan’s Emerging Global Role*, eds. Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pg. 113.

⁵⁰ Pyle, Kenneth, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1992), pg. 130.

⁵¹ One could argue that Japan’s recent interpretation of its constitution is merely a concession to foreign pressure that does not fully support Article 43 of the UN Charter which requires all UN members to make available to the Security Council “on its call...armed forces...for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” Therefore, if Japan cannot be counted on to fully support the UN Charter, it should not be granted a seat on the Security Council.

Japan's quest for a seat on the UN Security Council coincides with its seeking greater international respect and parity with its Western allies. Involvement in peace keeping operations would demonstrate Japan's desire for participation in managing international security. Japan's participation in resolving the Cambodian conflict provided Japan a means to express its regional leadership. The PRC is the only Asian state represented on the UN Security Council. Japan's attainment of a seat with veto power would cement its reputation as a political power as well as equalize its position versus the PRC in determining international security policy. Although factional politics and public opinion are the primary indicators of Japanese foreign policy, more flexible and nationalistic interpretations of Japan's Article 9 are likely to come in the future. Despite the anxieties of Japan's Asian neighbors, Japan's overseas military role in international peace and security activities has begun.

3. Post-Cold War Japanese National Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions

Japan maintains several aspects of its grand strategy of which the United States-Japan Security Alliance and regional multilateral collective security are a strong part. These will be discussed in a later chapter. Two points in Japan's policy directly concern China. The first is the continued implementation of assistance programs. Japan seeks to avoid isolating China in its economic development. The geographical location of China make its internal stability a primary security concern for Japan. Therefore, Japan hopes to welcome China as an emerging power into the regional economic community. Japan has been less critical of China's human rights violations and the Tiananmen crackdown, for fear of isolating China and increasing instability. The second point is the preparation of a self-defense capability with well-defined limits on equipment systems, operational ranges, and force structures.⁵² Assuming continued economic reform, China's growth into a superpower is inevitable. Moreover, economic development will lead to modernization and power projection capability. Therefore, Japan seeks to maintain a modest but highly

⁵² For all ten points in Japan's national strategy see Shikata, Toshiyuki, "Japan's Grand Strategy in the Succeeding Era," in *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, ed. Michael Bellows, 1994, pg. 64-67.

advanced self-defense force capable of defending the country's national interests in the region. Japan's policy concerning China has been accommodative and integrational due to the large stake Japan has in China's economic development.⁵³

China is a major factor in Japan's view towards international security and Asian regionalism in the post-cold war era. China's nationalism has led it to take a stronger stance concerning its territorial integrity. China has continually emphasized its position regarding Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Spratly Islands are expected to have large amounts of natural gas and oil reserves crucial to China's economic development. China's enhanced military development as well as its stance on territorial integrity has created apprehension in Japanese policy circles of the possible emergence of Chinese hegemony. China's development and acquisition of blue water hardware has led Japanese leaders to believe that China aims to "convert the South China Sea into the 'All China Sea,' seeking hegemony in the region and filling the vacuum formed in the wake of the end of the Cold War."⁵⁴ The Senkaku Islands dispute, (Diaoyudao in Chinese), which Japan claimed in 1891, was challenged by China's Territorial Waters Law in 1992, which stated that China would have the right to repel invaders by military means. China has fought criticism for its policy by advocating joint development of the islands' resources and commitment to negotiation, however, it has refused to withdraw its claims of sovereignty. The increase in China's navy may lead to a dangerous maritime hegemony in the region which is crucial to Japan's sea lanes of communication. Approximately seventy percent of Japan's energy supply is imported, most of it is oil. Sixty-eight percent of its oil comes from the Persian Gulf making Japan the largest importer of Gulf oil. Oil tankers must pass through the South China Sea on the way to Japan making these SLOC of strategic importance to Japan.⁵⁵

⁵³ Mochizuki, Mike, "Japan and the Strategic Quadrangle," in *The Strategic Quadrangle*, ed. Michael Mandelbaum, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), pg. 137.

⁵⁴ "Asia Becoming 'Wary' Over China's Naval Buildup," Kyoda, December 21, 1992, FBIS, cited in "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era", Brown, Eugene, *Asian Survey*, XXXIV, no. 5, May 1994, pg. 435.

⁵⁵ Smith, Janvier, "Affirming the Bond: U.S.-Japan Security in the Post-Cold War Age," paper for the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, May 1994.

China has not only intended to use diplomacy to back up its territorial claims. It has purchased 26 supersonic SU-27 Flankers, 50 T-72 tanks, 100 S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia, acquired air refueling technology, agreed to buy 24 MiG-31 Foxhound high altitude interceptors, expressed interest in the Tu-22M Backfire bomber with a 2,500 mile range, three Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft, and up to four Kilo-class submarines. It has also been looking at the aircraft carrier *Varyag* from the Ukraine. Although China has decided not to buy this ship, it has continued to seek this warfare capability. China has also sought a deal with Burma for a naval observation post in the Indian ocean. This would be a major advance for a blue water navy. While other countries over the last five years have been cutting military budgets, China's has increased. Defense spending has reached over 10 percent since 1989 and by 1993 reached 7.4 billion dollars. China's actual defense spending has reached between 27 and 43 billion dollars. This does not take into account that actual military expenditure may be higher due to resources that come to the PLA from other budgets.⁵⁶

Sino-Japanese relations have gone through a series of cycles of stability and tension over the last century. Presently neither country views the other as an adversary, however, despite economic interdependence, both countries modernize their military capabilities. To analyze the future of the Sino-Japanese relationship one must take into account the historical foundation of this relationship. Chinese nationalism has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. In an effort to be strong, China must become economically sound and undergo reform. China realizes it must seek cooperation and a peaceful stable environment to promote the rapid economic development necessary for the survival of the Chinese communist regime. Moreover, the development of China's economy is crucial to its reputation as a national power. Chinese policy makers focus on a stronger China becoming a dominant player in the region receiving its due respect. The

⁵⁶ Data compiled from CRS Report for Congress, "China as a Security Concern in Asia," Sutter, Robert and Kan, Shirley, December 1994, "Asia's Scramble for Arms," Jenkins, David, *World Press Review*, 40, no. 6, June 1993, "The Rise of China," Kristof, Nicholas, *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 5, November-December 1993. For conflicting data see Chen, Qimao, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, XXXIII, no. 3, March 1993.

century of "shame and humiliation" remains deeply ingrained in the Chinese memory. China will not be content as a status quo power. When China regains its superpower status, it will try to do all that superpowers do. A strong military, evidence of national power, will boost China's prestige and credibility concerning its claims on territorial interests. The islands in the South China Sea remain a potential conflict regarding both countries as each depends on open lines of communications and energy resources for its survival. China maintains suspicion of Japanese militarism characterized by Japan's leaving the East for the West and attempting to return to the East with military power.

Similar to China, Japanese nationalism has reasserted itself in the post-Cold War era. Japan has continually sought a greater role in the international environment. For Japan, the questions of the early twentieth century, power parity and economic development, have resurfaced on the threshold of the twenty-first. The Japanese foreign policy approach towards China remains uncertain. Japanese leaders have expressed remorse over aggression in World War Two, yet no official apology has been made. Japan has played a significant role in the future development of the Chinese economy, however, an increase in economic development will lead to larger military acquisitions and greater conflict over resources in the South China Sea. A Japanese sinologist commented; "We Japanese hope that China will continue to devote all its energies to the task of modernization. We also hope that it will never succeed."⁵⁷

Although China and Japan are close in a cultural and geographic aspects, they remain divisive regarding political and security issues. Sino-Japanese relations are the most uncertain because each state has different strengths and priorities. China, as a Middle Kingdom, has given way to China as a regional and global actor. Japan seeks parity in world power relations with highly technological defense capabilities. As each country continues its economic expansion and seeks a place in the region, security issues will overshadow future relations. Nationalism, based on the stigmas of the past, will continue to affect the future of Sino-Japanese relations into the next century.

⁵⁷ Harding, Harry, *China and Northeast Asia*, 1988, pg. 54.

III. NATIONALISM IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

A. CRITICAL HISTORICAL EVENTS IN NATIONALISTIC DEVELOPMENT

Korea has been exposed to foreign influences since its original contact with China in the second century BC. Despite the influences of China, foreign invasions, Japanese colonization and cultural genocide, and Marxism in the North, South Korea has been able to develop and establish a sense of nationalism and Korean identity. This chapter will look at the impact the Korean-Japanese relationship has had on the rise and transformation of Korean nationalism. During the Yi Dynasty the consciousness of this nation, influenced by a new ideology, language, and foreign invasions, developed into a powerful form of Korean nationalism. The Tonghak philosophy, seeking political, social, and economic reforms modernized Korean nationalism. Anti-foreignism became the nationalistic theme facing the Japanese occupation that reinforced the spirit of Korean independence. Because Japan has played a direct role in the development of Korean nationalism, the second and third sections of this chapter will review the Cold War and post-Cold War ROK-Japan and DPRK-Japan relationships. North Korean-Japanese relations have been inconsistent since the Korean War. South Korean-Japanese relations have been marked by mistrust and misunderstanding despite a normalization treaty in 1965. South Korean-Japanese economic relations continue amongst the memory of Japanese oppression and anxiety against a Japan seeking regional dominance. Underlining the present "two Koreas" policy of Japan is the inevitable reunified Korea; more economically independent and a stronger player in the regional balance of power.

1. Early Japanese Invasions

During the latter part of the Yi dynasty, strong anti-foreign sentiment emerged as the Koreans resisted the Japanese and Manchu invasions. In 1592, a Japanese army under Hideyoshi, intent on conquering China, invaded Korea. The resistance of the Righteous Volunteer Army against these forces was an example of the collective resilience of the Korean people. The Korean army fought the Japanese to protect the king and to maintain order and discipline. It was a nation wide participation, organizing all occupations,

classes, religious sects, and political factions into one unit.¹ Admiral Yi became Korea's premier national hero by defeating over 250 Japanese vessels with his newly invented ironclads forcing the invaders to retreat due to cut supply lines. The Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1637 followed the Japanese invasions, completing the economic disruption of the nation. Plundering and killing in the northwest provinces aroused greater animosity against their regime and led to an intense period of isolation.

2. Opening of the "Hermit Kingdom"

Modern nationalism is defined as a "mass movement in which the people demand an ever widening participation in the political, social, and cultural life of the nation, and for a government of the same ethnic complexion as the majority." To be separate, distinct and independent from other nations, and equal to them, is the fundamental claim of nationalists for their people.² This form of nationalism found its way into the minds of the Korean people at the turn of the century as a national reaction to foreign intrusions.

Korea had remained a relatively "Hermit Kingdom" up until the end of the nineteenth century. The Koreans were successful in defending their borders against the French in 1866 and the Americans in 1866 and 1871. The arrival of foreign warships aroused anti-foreign reactions and sparked the rise of the nativist religion, Tonghak or "Eastern Learning." Tonghak offered the people immediate rewards for this lifetime if the people observed the avoidance of evil, greed and adultery. It contained ideas and doctrines from Confucianism, Buddhism, Shamanism, and Christianity. It sought to revitalize Confucian's five relationships and loyalty to the monarch. "Repel the barbarians" and "Protect the nation and the people" were its slogans.³ Its preachings were egalitarian, anti-Western, and anti-foreign. It sought to replace China as the world leader and center with a new outlook towards Asia as part of a larger international system. With

¹ Kim, Young-soo, *The Identity of the Korean People, A History of Legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula*, (The Republic of Korea: National Unification Board, 1983), pg. 19.

² Kohn, Hans, "Nationalism" in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 11, ed. David Sills, (Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), pg. 65.

³ Kim, Young-soo, *The Identity of the Korean People*, 1983, pg. 16.

the fall of Chinese superiority, there was no alternative for Korea except to become both politically and philosophically independent.⁴

By 1875, the Korean court was corrupt and under intense political factions. The Japanese, seeing the political instability, pressured Korea into signing the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 succeeding where the Western countries had previously failed. China, concluding the treaty with Japan was a threat, sent advisers to Korea to confirm treaties with United States (1882), England and Germany (1883), Italy and Russia (1884), and France (1886) to offset the growing Japanese influence. Korea's door was now wide open. The Tonghaks did not have to wait long for China to decline.

3. The Tonghak Rebellion

In 1894, China was suffering from foreign wars and internal rebellion and Japan's military leaders saw the opportunity for hegemony in East Asia. Peasants, tired of corruption, exploitation and inflated taxes revolted in Cholla province. This movement was similar to the Taiping rebellion in China (1850-1864), and the Boxer incident in 1900 with the use of religion as the foundation of the movement, followed by armed attacks on the government and nationalistic ideals. The Boxers and Tonghaks both expressed xenophobia. The Tonghaks issued a twelve point program for reform. Realizing the downfall of the present government was imminent, they sought to raise the national identity in the face of foreigners. The Korean government sought the aid of China to suppress the rebellion. Japan sent in troops to maintain the balance in the area according to the Tientsin Treaty. Following the suppression of the Tonghaks, neither China nor Japan showed any inclination of troop withdrawal. A Japanese regiment seized the royal palace, dismissed the Min clan, and replaced Taewongoun as the ruler. This touched off the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese defeated the Chinese forces on land and sea and reformed the Korean cabinet under Japanese hegemony. Japan made every effort to remove any remainder of Chinese influence in the name of "maintenance of Korean independence" and "reform." One of the major reforms forced on the Koreans was the cutting off the topknot. In the Confucian tradition, the topknot represented a mature man

⁴ Lee, Chong-sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1963), pg. 22.

and was a sign of filial piety. According to Japanese officials, cutting the topknot was a sign of modernization. This was the first blow to the Korean cultural tradition. Retention of the topknot became a symbol of the preservation of Korean custom and national identity that only fueled anti-Japanese sentiment. Japan, the major foreign influence in Korea, sought to establish monopolistic control over markets and resources. Ironically, the Tonghak rebellion, whose mission was independence from foreigners and agricultural reform, provided the means for Japanese hegemony. The close relationship between China and Korea had ended.

The Koreans turned to Russia in order to balance the power of the Japanese. Aware of the Russian influence, Japanese assassins killed Queen Min, a leader of the pro-Russian faction. In 1904, the Japanese fleet attacked the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, commencing the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese easily defeated the Russians and drove them out of Korea by 1905.⁵ Korea first signed an agreement for Japanese offices in the administration of finances, defense, and foreign relations. In 1905, Korea signed the Protectorate Treaty disbanding the Korean army. This treaty marked the beginning of a forty year colonial rule by Japan and the start of the greatest nationalistic movement that now became anti-Japanese. In 1910, the annexation treaty was signed under coercion. As a result, "Japan robbed Korea of the national rights by the Annexation of Japan and Korea...."⁶ Because of the Japanese invasion and the country's annexation, nationalism continued to grow but as anti-Japanese sentiment. The Japanese gave the Korean people, once again, a national enemy against which to rally.

4. The Japanese Occupation and the March First Movement

Japanese colonialism provided the Korean people, regardless of their social background, a common enemy to resist. Japanese oppression reaffirmed the sense of national identity and an independent nation state. What was originally declared as good for the welfare of the Korean people, in 1905, led to military dictatorship and brutal repression. Japan justified its repression in the name of efficiency.

⁵ Kim, Young-soo, *The Identity of the Korean People*, 1983, pg. 28-31.

⁶ Ibid., pg. 165.

The Yamagata-Katsura view saw an independent Korea as a threat to Japan's and the Far East's security, economic administrative development as requiring Japan's firm guiding hand, and complete integration into Japan as the ultimate social goal. It advocated forcible, instant and complete overthrow of opposition....⁷

The military and dictatorial policies of the Japanese government from 1910-1919 were considered illegitimate in the eyes of the Koreans. General Akashi Motojiro was the commander of the Japanese force in Korea in 1907. Under his supervision thousands of Korean rebels were killed and tortured. This general was one of the most oppressive and authoritarian leaders whose measures, employed in industry, politics, and communications, led to Japan's successful annexing and ruling of Korea.

There had been small anti-Japanese uprisings during the early years of occupation, particularly by the Righteous Army, but had died down by 1911. No movement was as monumental as the March First rebellion in 1919. The feelings of losing independence to a long distrusted neighbor culminated in this movement. People from every religion, education, age and occupation composed this movement, making it a national movement united against the dictatorial rule of the Japanese. The rebellion was inspired by President Wilson's Fourteen Points speech at the 1918 Versailles Peace Conference, that emphasized the doctrine of self determination. Therefore, the Korean people thought the world was in favor of its independence since it corresponded to the international view of the time.

The movement began with the Declaration of Korean Independence signed by prominent Korean nationalist leaders in Seoul on March 1, 1919. The peaceful demonstration that spread nationwide declared seven points: Korea was an independent nation, Korea was suffering under and alien oppression, every Korean had a moral duty to bring about independence, the merging of Japan and Korea was harmful, the independence of Korea would be for the good of Japan and China, a new age of justice had come, and

⁷ Henderson, Gregory, *Korea, The Politics of the Vortex*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pg. 73.

Koreans must display their desire and ability to maintain independence.⁸ The Japanese, surprised by such an uprising, responded with the use of force through beatings, arrests, and village burnings to subdue the activists. By the end of the nation-wide upheaval Korean nationalists estimated over 7500 deaths, 15,000 injured, and 45,000 arrests.⁹ Although the movement failed to bring independence to Korea it was successful in uniting the nation and nationalistic movements such as the Independence Club, the Self Strengthening Association, and the New Democratic Association. The activists looked to the West as a source of liberal ideas not as imperialists. Moreover, it relied on the Western proclamation of self determination not the traditional values of Confucianism. The movements' intellectuals and leaders, who received Western education, brought thoughts of civil rights of the nation to the forefront. The Preamble to the constitution of the Republic of Korea came from the independence spirit of the March First Movement:

We the people of Korea, proud of a glorious history, a brilliant culture and a tradition of cherishing peace from time immemorial imbued with the sublime spirit of independence as manifested in the March First Movement....¹⁰

The failure of the movement led to a diversification of nationalistic activities ranging from guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks, and diplomatic representations for foreign assistance. The disturbances were motivated not so much by the hope for independence but by resentment toward the Japanese. The Korean Provisional Government was established as a means to unite the various movements but was a victim of intense ideological struggle between its Communist and nationalist members. Some members, disillusioned with the West, turned to Marxism as the means to liberate the oppressed and found its anti-imperialist orientation attractive. From 1931 to 1945 the Japanese sought to eliminate the cultural identity of the Korean people. Koreans were forbidden to use their language, students were taught to believe in the superiority of the Japanese race, people

⁸ Lee, Chung-sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 1963, pg. 118.

⁹ Eckert, Carter, ed. *Korea Old and New, A History*, (Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), pg. 279.

¹⁰ Kim, Young-soo, *The Identity of the Korean People*, 1983, pg. 211.

were ordered to change their names to Japanese forms. Japan sought to step up its cultural genocide in the face of the Second World War instead of giving the Koreans greater independence in return for support. The Japanese bureaucracy crushed the press, newspapers, literature on Korean culture, and overt political activity. Finally, commoners were conscripted into the Japanese army in 1943. Thousands were mobilized to work in factories and mines in Manchuria, North Korea, and Japan. Koreans were recruited to go to Japan to fill menial positions vacated by Japanese in support of the Japanese army.¹¹ The effects of the mass mobilization of the Korean population generated deeper resentment of the Japanese. Japan was removed from power by the allied forces at the conclusion of the war. However, Americans only added to Korean frustration by using Japanese and Korean collaborators for the sake of administrative efficiency. The Western powers, whose political ideals were so influential in the quest for Korean independence, caused its division at the end of the Second World War.

Victorious Americans and Soviets could not agree on the future of Korea. Both powers, seeking to protect their security interests, wanted to insure that a reunified Korea, regardless of its political nature, would be a friendly Korea. Within Korea, ideological differences reemerged further alienating the factions of the nationalist movement. In 1948, the United States succeeded in promoting a UN-sponsored election in South Korea for an independent government of Korea. Elections were held establishing Syngman Rhee as president of the newly formed Republic of Korea that claimed legitimacy as the sole legal government of Korea. The South Korean government was deemed illegitimate by North Korea and ten days later the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was formed that proclaimed itself the legal government on the peninsula. The peninsula was violently separated by political differences as military clashes along the 38th parallel between the two governments increased. On June 25, 1950 North Korean forces invaded South Korea ultimately leading to the three year devastation of both halves of the peninsula and making much more difficult any efforts to rebuild a unified nation.

¹¹ Eckert, Carter, ed., *Korea Old and New: A History*, 1990, pg. 322-323.

The war ended in a stalemate around the 38th parallel. Following the war, both Koreas set out to establish legitimacy and promote the economic development of their state. The 1953 division of North and South Korea has resulted in two distinct ideologies, but each posits essentially the same long term goal of Korean unification. Although the ultimate goal of both Koreas is unification, the means and outcome of reunification are distinct. North Korea aims at reunification of the peninsula under Pyongyang's political terms while South Korea seeks the establishment of a reunified Korea based on its democratic principles. The nationalistic view expresses itself by pro-democracy statements in the South and anti-imperialist rhetoric in the North. North Korea rejects the South Korean view of nationalism and maintains the extreme nationalist concept of "juche." This is a closed, fanatical, and inward-looking principle underlining Kim Il Sung revolutionary thought.¹² Although nationalism can express itself through various political regimes, South Korea maintains a nationalism in which unification, modernization and democratization are its main tasks.¹³ Each government uses political rhetoric, economic and athletic competition, and diplomatic maneuvering to promote its sense of nationalism. Korean nationalism has been a basic factor in changing the Korea-Japan relationship.

B. KOREA'S COLD WAR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

"Do not be deceived by the Soviets
Don't count on the Americans
The Japanese will soon rise again
So Koreans, be careful!"

Popular Korean saying after liberation.¹⁴

¹² For a more complete view of North Korean Communism see Gregory Henderson *Korea, Politics of the Vortex*, Part IV and Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).

¹³ Yang, Sung Chul, "The Evolution of Korean Nationalism", *Korea and World Affairs*, 11, no. 3, 1987, from *Kuksa Daekwan*, Pyong-do Lee, pg. 470.

¹⁴ Steinberg, David, *The Republic of Korea, Economic Transformation and Social Change*, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), pg. 158.

1. South Korea's Normalization with Japan

Following the end of World War Two, Japanese-Korean relations were hostile. Japan had left Korea with substantial corporate assets, modern farming, irrigation, and agricultural research that allowed Korea to modernize its rural sector. However, Japan developed this infrastructure for the benefit of the Japanese empire. Korea emphasized Korean education turning its interests to all things Korean. Japan was viewed not only as an economic model to follow but as a rival in which the Koreans were determined to surpass.

Cooperation between South Korea and Japan did not materialize until the Normalization Treaty in 1965, securing a 500 million dollar aid and loan packaged from Japan.¹⁵ Despite this treaty, the relationship between the two countries has been marked by mistrust and misunderstanding.

Animosities from the colonialization period continue to influence Korean perceptions of the Japanese.

For many Koreans, the harsh Japanese colonialization of the Koreans and the ruthless 16th century invasion of Hideyoshi are as active a memory as yesterday's perception of another Japanese insult. It is no overstatement to say that being anti-Japanese is almost ingrained in the Korean national character.¹⁶

The normalization treaty started the slow process of good intentions. However, the Koreans remained wary due to the fact that Japan did not recognize the ROK as the sole government on the peninsula nor make a formal apology for its colonialization. Koreans believe that Japan had profited from the Korean War and throughout the cold war since South Korea maintained the barrier against the spread of Communism. Koreans, living in Japan, remain discriminated against and suffer legal and social injustices. The racist attitude of the Japanese to the Koreans as an "inferior people" remains in the Japanese mindset.

¹⁵ Chan, Paul, *From Colony to Neighbor: Relations Between Japan and South Korea, 1945-1985*, (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Information Service, 1989), pg. 318.

¹⁶ Olsen, E., "United States-Japan-South Korea Relations", in *Korean Challenges and American Policy*, ed. Ilpyong J. Kim, (New York, NY: Paragon House, 1991), pg. 380.

Korean-Japanese relations cooled in the 1970s as a result of the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, the assassination of Madame Park, and an increase in anti-Japanese sentiment. Kim Dae-jung, the opposition in the 1971 presidential election, planned a rally in Tokyo on August 15, 1973. He was kidnapped from his downtown hotel by agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. President Park Chung Hee denied the involvement of the KCIA but Japanese officials were already angered at such a violation of international law.¹⁷ Japan responded through economic sanctions, reducing aid, credits, and exports that affected many investment projects in South Korea. Within a year, President Park's wife was assassinated by a Korean resident of Japan. Park held Japan responsible citing the assassin was a Korean resident from Osaka, came to South Korea by a false visa, and stole the pistol from an Osaka police station.¹⁸ Park turned the assassination of his wife into a diplomatic counter to the kidnapping incident accusing Japan as a base for anti-South Korea forces by North Korea. South Koreans were already uneasy about the invasion of Japanese business that had entered the country. Students, the media, and political activists saw Japanese big business as a means of foreign domination and the exploitation of cheap South Korean labor. With the recent memory of brutal colonialism, many Koreans were not ready to accept Japan's aggressive economic measures.

The increase in hostilities by North Korea and leadership changes during the 1980s strengthened the relationship between Japan and South Korea. Prior diplomatic grievances became secondary to the Communist threat approaching both countries. Both Chun Doo Hwan and Prime Minister Nakasone sought to improve foreign relations. Prime Minister Nakasone was the first prime minister of Japan to make an official visit to South Korea. As a result of this visit, Chun was able to secure a four billion dollar aid package for South Korea and a joint communiqué between the two leaders expressed concerns with the Korean peninsula. It included: maintenance of peace and stability on

¹⁷ Chang, Dal-Joong, "The End of Cold War and the Future of South Korea-Japan Relations," *Korea and World Affairs*, 16, no. 3, 1992, pg. 510-511.

¹⁸ Chan, Paul, *From Colony to Neighbor*, 1989, pg. 227.

the Korean Peninsula is an urgent necessity for peace and stability in East Asia, including Japan; both countries will work towards peace, stability and prosperity of the Korean peninsula; and Japan highly values the defense efforts by South Korea.¹⁹ Emperor Hirohito at a state banquet stated, "... It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe that it should not be repeated."²⁰

2. North Korea's Relations with Japan

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintains that the reunification of the peninsula under socialism is the ultimate goal of its foreign policy. The immediate goal of North Korea is the preservation and legitimization of its militarized and totalitarian regime for the reunification of Korea under Pyongyang's terms.²¹ North Korea, convinced that its ideology and social system is the way for a unified Korea, criticizes South Korea as a puppet of the imperialists through its alliance with the United States. Pyongyang is committed to the "liberation" of South Korea from the imperialists by military means if necessary. North Korea, claiming to be the only true government of Korea and desiring world status and prestige, continues to seek legitimacy and respect by outside powers to strengthen its national security and domestic stability.

Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea's policy regarding Japan has been ambivalent. North Korea declared that Japan, the imperialist of World War Two, had teamed up with the United States; the imperialist of the Korean War. Japan's goals of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere have not changed in the eyes of the Pyongyang regime. Moreover, the political ideology of "juche" is highly anti-imperialistic emphasizing self-reliance to solve the nations problems by its own efforts independent of others.²² Despite the anti-imperialist rhetoric, North Korean leadership, in an effort to rival South Korea, continually sought economic relations with Japan.

¹⁹ Ibid., pg. 307-308.

²⁰ Ibid., pg. 310.

²¹ Eggleston, Karen, "Chinese and Korean Foreign Policy Goals and Sino-Korean Relations," *Korea Observer*, XXIII, no. 3, 1992, pg. 319.

²² Roy, Denny, "North Korea's Relations with Japan," *Asian Survey*, XXVIII, no. 12, December, 1988, pg. 1282.

Following the Korean War, North Korea depended on its socialist allies for trade and assistance. In 1955, the Japanese government chose to limit economic exchanges with the North amounting to minor indirect trade through Hong Kong and Dairen. In 1961, Japan lifted its ban on direct trade and relaxed the "barter system" requirement in 1962, leading to increased levels of trade up until 1965. This same year marked the normalization between South Korea and Japan which led to reduced trade between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Japan recognized South Korea as the only lawful government of Korea in compliance with the United Nations resolution in 1948. Thus, any diplomatic relations between the two states were ruled out. The treaty with South Korea was seen as hostile to the North. Pyongyang accused Japan of conspiring with the United States and South Korea to perpetuate the division of Korea through the policy of "cross recognition." By establishing relations with Japan, North Korea would undermine the cause of reunification, thus supporting "cross recognition."²³

Trade fluctuated during the 1970s and 1980s between the two countries as Japanese businessmen became more interested in the North Korean market. Japan and the DPRK signed an agreement to expand trade to 500 million dollars by 1976. Therefore, Japan had become the North's largest nonsocialist trading partner. Large trade deficits in the later half of this decade showed a decrease in the trade relations between the two countries. North Korea, unable to pay for its trade deficits, forced a reevaluation by Japanese officials concerning Japan's bilateral relations with North Korea. The fluctuation in relations continued throughout the 1980s as trade increased following a debt repayment agreement. The North Korean Joint Venture Law, passed in 1984, encouraged foreign investment and specifically mentioned Japan as a primary financial supporter. Kim Il Sung successfully linked trade with Japan to "juche" justifying what was good for Korea was in support of the principle of "juche." The North's leadership stressed that the Japanese who traded with North Korea were "progressive, courageous and independent minded" where as the government was "capitalist-oriented, and subservient to American imperialism."²⁴

²³ Kim, Hong Nack, "The Normalization of North Korean-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, Problems and Prospects," *Korea and World Affairs*, 14, no. 4, 1990, pg. 651.

²⁴ Koh, Byung Chul, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea*, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1969), pg. 189.

As South Korea began to progress economically and diplomatically the pressure increased for North Korea to maintain equivalence with South Korea. Obviously, trade with Japan would enhance North Korea's economy. Pyongyang needed high technology goods that were not available through its socialist allies. Moreover, Pyongyang felt that any connection with Tokyo would yield greater leverage over the Japanese government and place a strain on Japanese relations with Seoul. This would also help establish diplomatic equivalence with the South. A Pyongyang official, Kim Yong-Nam, stated: "Japan-South Korea relations are between those two countries; they do not concern us."²⁵ This indicated that in the face of losing economic ground to the South, North Korea was willing to establish diplomatic ties with Japan even though Japan officially recognized South Korea. However, terrorist attacks in 1983 and 1985 forced punitive actions by Japan. The Rangoon bombing in 1983, killing seventeen South Korean diplomats and the destruction of a Korean Airlines passenger plane, killing one hundred fifteen people, forced Japanese sanctions and restricted official visits. These sanctions were lifted in 1988 following a meeting with officials of the JSP. Japan saw the 1988 "Northern Policy," issued by South Korea's Roh Tae Woo, as an opportunity to reestablish relations with the North. In addition to lifting sanctions concerning the KAL bombing, a delegation of the Korean Worker's Party was allowed to visit Japan.

There is a significant amount of pro-Pyongyang sentiment in Japan consisting of the Japanese Socialist Party, some sectors of Japanese business, and the Chosen Soren (Chongryun). The Chosen Soren, or General Association of Koreans, is the primary organization that promotes North Korean issues in Japan. Following the Second World War, approximately forty percent of the six hundred thousand Koreans who stayed in Japan swore allegiance to Chongryun and Kim Il Sung as the defender of Korean interests.²⁶ This association is the primary financial contributor to the North's hard currency and pro-DPRK Japanese officials. In 1958, this organization forced political

²⁵ Kim, Young C, "North Korea in 1980: The Son Also Rise," *Asian Survey*, XXI, no. 1, January 1981, pg. 123.

²⁶ Desmond, Edward, "Kim Il Sung's money pipeline," *Time*, 143, no. 24, 13 June 1994, pg. 27.

pressure for the repatriation of Korean Nationals in Japan. South Korea severely criticized the emigration of Koreans to the North. South Korea accused the Chosen Soren as serving as an intelligence network and training facility for spies and terrorists against South Korea. This issue surfaced when the terrorists of the Korean Airlines jet bombing obtained passports from Korean residents in Japan.

Since the Korean War, the relations between North Korea and Japan have been economically and diplomatically inconsistent. Prior to South Korean support for cross recognition, any recognition by Japan of North Korea would have been destabilizing to its Washington and Seoul relations. Japan was inclined to maintain the status quo concerning North Korean relations. Japan successfully exploited trade with both Koreas but recognized only one. Japan's actions did not favor a unified Korea under either ideology, nor did it promote reunification.

C. KOREA'S POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

1. South Korea, North Korea, and Japan

The end of the cold war has directly affected the most recent relations between the two countries. The fall of the Soviet Union has reduced the Communist threat that had been the foundation for the goodwill exchanged between South Korea and Japan during the 1980s. South Korea has become less essential to Japan's security than it had been previously.

North Korea is an immediate threat to South Korea and a primary threat to Japan since Pyongyang's recent withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. To secure its position, Japan opened normalization talks with North Korea resulting in the 1990 joint declaration signed by the leading political parties, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Japanese Socialist Party, and the Korean Worker's party in Pyongyang.²⁷ In 1990, approximately 60 billion yen flowed to North Korea from Japan. On average, 747 million dollars in currency and capital reaches the DPRK through remittances from Koreans

²⁷ Wood, Perry, "The Strategic Equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s," in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton, (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pg. 200.

residents in Japan.²⁸ The ROK saw this as a direct setback in any North-South relations as economic aid to Kim Il Sung would postpone reforms and compromise with the South. Japan's action also gave merit to the belief that Japan would rather have a divided peninsula to prevent the rise of an economic rival in a unified Korea. Japan is threatened not only by a nuclear armed Korea but also by the risk that a unified Korea would be less subject to Japanese influence. A union of a resource-filled North with a capitalist South Korea would be a formidable rival to Japanese power in Northeast Asia.²⁹ China and Russia might see a unified Korea as a counter to Japan. South Korea reestablished economic and diplomatic relations with Russia in 1991 and China in 1992. Both countries promised not to block South Korea's seeking a seat at the United Nations. Japan views China and Russia as two potentially hostile neighbors. Therefore, forging a closer relationship with South Korea could prove beneficial to Japan. South Korea maintains that as long as friendly dialogue continues between North and South Korea, normalization between Japan and North Korea will not disrupt reunification policies.

Despite the unsettling relations involving North Korea, the leaders of Japan and Korea have sought reduced tension between the two states. Prime Minister Hosokawa apologized to the Korean women who were forced into prostitution by Japanese soldiers during the Second World War. President Kim Young Sam has reduced the number of Japanese goods banned from South Korea by one half. Furthermore, Prime Minister Hosokawa promised to increase deregulation of Japan's economy for South Korean products.³⁰ The Prime Minister also issued a formal apology for Japan's World War Two occupation of Korea to which President Kim Young Sam in an interview responded,

We have a long unfortunate history. When the Prime Minister admitted last year that Japan invaded Korea, I think he honestly apologized. I have made it very clear that we don't need any monetary compensation. What

²⁸ Sato, Katsumi, "Japan: Stop Funding Kim Il Sung," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 156, no. 30, 26 July 1993, pg. 23.

²⁹ Segal, Gerald, "North-East Asia: common security or a la carte?" *International Affairs*, 67, no. 4, October 1991, pg 762.

³⁰ "Role Reversal: South Korea and Japan," *The Economist*, 13 November 1993, pg. 37.

we need from Japan is moral recognition of its wrongdoing. We should not be burdened by what happened in history, although we should not forget what happened in the past. It is very important for Korea and Japan, and for that matter, for peace in Asia.³¹

Regardless of the political statements from Korean and Japanese officials, Korean schools continue to drill their students with facts concerning Japanese colonialism. In June 1995, Former Japanese Foreign Minister and still leader in the Liberal Democratic Party, Michio Watanabe, claimed that Korea had "harmoniously" agreed in 1910 to occupation by Japan. This led to demonstrations in several South Korean cities and denunciations by Korean newspapers. Prime Minister Lee Hong Koo, responded to the false interpretation: "The Government and all of the South Korean people can't help expressing shock and deep concern over his remarks."³² This recent incident shows the continued distrust over Japan's failure to apologize for wartime misconduct. Furthermore, Japan continues its prejudice towards Koreans living in Japan which further fuels Korean animosity. Moreover, Prime Minister Murayama, elected in June 1994, comes from the Social Democratic Party who traditionally have sympathized with North Korea. Clearly, South Korea is not ready to forget its recent history.

2. Post-Cold War South Korean National Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions

South Korea maintains five points regarding its national security: (1) deter war with the North; (2) peaceful unification; (3) deter the spread of nuclear weapons by the North and promote a nuclear free peninsula; (4) seek regional stability and balance of power between China, Russia, Japan and the U.S.; and (5) foster economic interdependence.³³

³¹ "Trouble in the East", *Time*, 28 March 1994, pg. 42.

³² Kristof, Nicholas, "Japan Expresses Regret of a Sort for the War," *The New York Times*, 7 June 1995, pg. A11.

³³ Lee, Seo-Hang, "Korean Military Forces: Searching for Peace and Stability through multilateral Security Regimes," in *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, ed. Michael Bellows, 1994, pg. 197.

A peaceful unification of the peninsula is the primary concern of South Korea, since without internal security and stability, external threats are insignificant. A gradual transition of the North is essential to avoid the high cost of reunification. Therefore, South Korea rejects unification by absorption, however, the ROK must be prepared for such a contingency. Japan can play a large role in Korea's unification but how much of an influence will South Korea accept? The belief that opening up Korea economically will cause the fall of the North's Communist regime and the modernization of its economy will make it easier for South Korea to assimilate is credible. All countries involved would benefit from this economic strategy. The problem exists in the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime. The absorption of the North Korean society would require large financial layouts which South Korea cannot produce alone. Assistance would have to come from other countries. Two of the prime candidates would be Taiwan and Japan. However, the ROK government is fully aware that any large financial assistance given by Japan will not come without conditions. To be financially dependent on Japan is another reason South Korea does not want rapid reunification of the peninsula. Moreover, North Korean ideology is very different from that of South Korea. "Juche" is firmly established in the minds of the North Korean elite and people. Drastic ideological reform would have to occur for unification.

The status of Japan's Self Defense Force is another concern of Korean policymakers. As previously discussed, Japan's increased military defense expenditures and change in military policies regarding its Self Defense Forces, have stirred up the anxiety in Northeast Asia. Increased military operations by Japan and closer ties with North Korea would be a direct play for a greater balance of power in the face of increased Sino-South Korean or Russo-South Korean relations. South Korea lacks the military strength and the resources to provide security through physical means. Therefore, it must discourage other countries from seeking aggression or influence on the peninsula.³⁴ South Korea, not powerful enough to counter Japan or China alone, can utilize its recent

³⁴ Kim, Kyung-Won, "Korea and the U.S. in the Post-Cold War World," *Korea and World Affairs*, 18, no. 2 Summer 1994, pg 224.

diplomatic position to balance any hegemonic influence in the region. South Korea needs to ensure a stable security equilibrium through a balance of power. Maintaining bilateral relations with the four powers would successfully ensure a stable region as South Korea would be able to play off any dominant power. If South Korea does not maintain close security relations with the United States, it will have to identify its position with a newly emerging Asian power. Moreover, a reunified Korea, with greater resources and possible nuclear capability, would be a strong player in the regional balance of Northeast Asia.

3. Post-Cold War Japanese National Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions

In March 1993, North Korea decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, making the security environment of Northeast Asia increasingly uncertain. North Korea is an issue of Japanese security since the possession of weapons of mass destruction or a war on the peninsula would threaten the survival of Japan. "There are entire regions of Japan that would suffer immense losses in terms of life and property should violence on the Korean Peninsula spill over to the Japan."³⁵ Any war in Korea would bring Japanese involvement as United States forces would be deployed from Japan and North Korea would seek to neutralize or counter this threat. As previously stated, with the normalization between Seoul and Beijing, and Seoul and Moscow, Tokyo has sought to step up its relations with Pyongyang. It is hoped that this would lead to Japanese investment reducing tension on the peninsula and peace and security in the region. Despite the 1990 DPRK-Japan joint declaration, North Korea's recent test firing of a missile with chemical and nuclear warhead capability has caused some anxiety in Japan. A nuclear weapon in the hands of an unstable regime is a source of apprehension for many Japanese. In 1992, Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe stated that Japan's most fundamental perception of the Kim Il Sung regime is: "We cannot trust North Korea."³⁶ Furthermore, there does not exist a security tie between South Korea and Japan. A future

³⁵ Tajiri, Tadashi, "Korea in Japan's Arc of Crisis," *Global Affairs*, 7, no. 4, 1992, pg. 79.

³⁶ Brown, Eugene, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *Asian Survey*, XXXIV, no. 5, May 1994, pg. 437.

conflict will challenge both countries but neither country is particularly in favor of such a security link regarding the Korean peninsula.

South Korea's normalization with China and Russia shows its preoccupation with balance of power in the face of economic interdependence. Japan has maintained economic ties with South Korea, but realizing the alignment of China and South Korea or Russia and South Korea puts a new light on the security scenario. Seventy percent of South Korea's gross national product is based on foreign trade, therefore, economic interdependence is an essential element in Korean security. However, close economic ties do not suggest that Japanese-Korean rivalry will not reemerge. Japan's population is three times South Korea's and its economy is more than ten times as big. Memories of Japan's conduct during the occupation have not been forgotten. Korean acceptance of an economically superior Japan is one thing, but a militarily dominant Japan is another matter. In the absence of Cold War restraints and the normalization with China and Russia, it is highly unlikely that South Korea or a unified Korea will form a close security relationship with Japan. Korean suspicions of Japan are historically justified. Regardless of the increase in trade between the two states, historical suspicions will not be suppressed. Furthermore, a unified Korea will be a significant player, in its own right, in any new balance of power struggle.

IV. NATIONALISM IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA

A. CRITICAL HISTORICAL EVENTS IN NATIONALISTIC DEVELOPMENT

Korea has experienced domination by four pacific powers including centuries of domination by China, four decades of Japanese colonial rule, and several years of military occupation by the Soviet Union and the United States. Out of this period, Korean national identity developed in the face of adversity and intense hostility. Although both Koreas have common ancestry, language and cultural heritage, they have emerged as hostile independent ideological states. Nationalism, within Korea, is a force for reunification but the question remains whether a reunified Korea will become more assertive in regional affairs. Unlike Sino-Japanese or Korean-Japanese relations, Sino-Korean relations are not founded on hostility. This chapter will review the cultural and strategic importance that has overshadowed the Sino-Korean relationship.

During the Cold War, Sino-Korean relations were determined in the shadow of the strategic triangle. The PRC's policies, reflecting its position relative to the two superpowers, directly affected its relations with the Korean Peninsula. As Beijing attempted to define its national interests, its policies concerning the Koreas were redefined as well. The end of the Cold War has led to significant change in Chinese foreign policy behavior. The focus of the PRC's policy has been promoting national economic development and a peaceful international environment. This shift has led to the PRC's gaining greater leverage in the determination of regional security issues.

The PRC reestablished diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992, thus, reestablishing its position on the peninsula; a position it has sought since 1910. The economic and diplomatic ties between the two nations will greatly benefit both countries. The PRC tends to gain from South Korean investment and expansion of trade markets. Strategically, the Korean Peninsula has traditionally been a concern for Chinese security. Therefore, as the PRC becomes a stronger player in regional affairs, the outcome of the Korean dilemma will maintain a significant priority in Beijing's strategic calculations. The PRC can play a major role in Korea's reunification. Since it is the only country with influence in North Korea, the PRC will not alienate its northern ally. Close ties between

the PRC and a reunified Korea will rival and check expanding Japanese economic superiority and any possible military inclinations.

1. Early Chinese Cultural and Political Influence

The unity of the Korean people dates back to the period when Silla was able to overcome its rival enemies Kaya in 562 and Paekche in 660. This unification has great significance to the Korean people because it remained uninterrupted until foreign initiated division following the Korean War. In 676, the Silla kingdom achieved Korean autonomy from China's T'ang dynasty, but was significantly influenced by Chinese culture. This dynasty imported books and art from the T'ang as well as monks and students who studied Confucianism or Buddhism in China and returned to contribute to its cultural development. The Silla kingdom was highly centralized and aristocratic. Confucianism was the bureaucratic ideology but Buddhism was the state religion. The Chinese, although removed from Silla, left a strong cultural impact on the Koreans. The Chinese written language was used in the judicial system and Chinese artistic influence expressed itself in Korean architecture and literature. During this period Silla received and exported culture and technology throughout the region. In 815, one-third of the elite families in Japan were of Korean descent.¹ The Koryo Dynasty, (936-1392), continued the central bureaucratic tradition of the Silla. During this period the first invasions began along with anti-foreign sentiment. The state was threatened by the Khitan and Jurchen tribes living in the north but were overcome by the Mongols in 1231. When the agricultural base could not sustain the needs of the growing society, the dynasty crumbled under a military coup by General Yi. This military coup was the first in a long history to follow.

During the 518 year long Yi Dynasty, (1392-1910), Korea would develop a new state ideology, an alphabet, experience invasions and economic turbulence. Yi Korea was dominated by Confucianism. Buddhism was replaced by Confucianism as the nation's ideological philosophy. Confucianism molded the thought process of the people, the national character, as well as the cultural, political, social and economic patterns of the

¹ Steinberg, David, *The Republic of Korea, Economic Transformation and Social Change*, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), pg. 22-26.

nation. The Chu Hsi version of Confucianism was adopted by the Yi dynasty and became the means for the conduct of government and the ruling principle of social and familial life.

The policy of the government was based on the Confucian values in which the individual was taught to live in harmony with the environment, promote community welfare, and prevent disorder. The success of the society rested on the harmony and strengths of the groups within it. Confucianism, therefore, was a political and moral system. Koreans rejected the concept of individualism but emphasized the collective good of society over the individual interests. The individual identified himself through the five relationships, with family playing the central role in society. This emphasis on family was an analogy for state government. The government was an extended family with the ruler at its head. The king ruled by the Korean version of the "Mandate of Heaven," which he might forfeit if he failed to rule correctly. The ruler treated his subjects as a father would treat his children. Furthermore, the bureaucracy was expected to uphold the moral values of society and become examples for others. Age was equated with superiority which was evidence of great moral virtue, the highest going to the ruler.² Unlike the West, there was no separation between the moral, religious, social, and political factors of society. "The culmination of everything was the monarch and bureaucracy." The Yi administration left no institutions outside the central government, such as a moral power or religious power, to check governmental power. With the ruler as the pinnacle of the moral and religious system, no church consciousness could develop.³ One entered this bureaucratic system through the civil service examinations. Like China, the Yi administration utilized the merit examination system as the means to obtain a government position and ascend in social status. However, in Korea, not everyone was allowed to take the civil service examination. Only those who were members of an upper-class family were permitted to do so. China's system, in theory, provided social mobility for everyone. Conversely, the yangbans, educated in the Confucian traditions, monopolized government positions maintaining a rigid class structure. The social order was built around the hierarchical set

² Ibid., pg 93.

³ Henderson, Gregory, *Korea the Politics of the Vortex*, 1968, pg 24-25.

of relationships which governed the individual's behavior in society: the ruler to the subject, husband to wife, father to son, older brother to younger brother, friend to friend. This hierarchical set of relationships demanded obedience and submission to authority. It promoted inequality by providing certain rights to different people based on social class. The concept of li, proper conduct, would allow each individual to perform his proper function in society creating harmony. Therefore, the purpose of the government was to encourage the observance of the rules that would achieve harmony and social order in the world. International relations were merely an extension of this social order. Thus, a nation's duties were governed by the same rules that maintained the degree of harmony in the family and in the society. The Yi Dynasty prided itself on being more Confucian than its mentor. It adapted the Chinese political system and extended it to its society. Court records were kept in Chinese and scholars composed poetry and prose in Chinese. Thus, Yi Korea gained reputation in the cultural standing of the Chinese world. It was not until Chinese defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1894 that Chinese influence was removed from the peninsula.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the forging of an independence movement call Silhak, "Practical Learning," found its way into the minds of the intellectuals. The sense of self-reliance and individuality as a nation led to this process of greater national development. These intellectuals sought to become more in tune to practical issues that faced society at the time: relief from peasant poverty, agricultural reform, the development of internal commerce, and military organization. Because the Korean people had fought against foreign adversaries, they had developed the concept of independence. They strove for political, cultural, and social reform and by making detailed inquiries, established visions on which an ideal society might be based. The Silhak scholars concluded that the Korean people were subjects of the Korean king not the Chinese emperor and the nation, therefore, should be independent in state affairs. Furthermore, they declared Korea had its own traditional culture whose history had been totally different from that of China and sought independence from the Chinese world

order.⁴ This movement in intellectual thought was monumental in the development of Korean nationalism. It was a thought that tried to secure and improve the interests of the people and their living standards by the intellectuals. Although this thought did not lead to policy changes in the government it awoke the people to a new view and understanding of Korean history and national independence.

2. Korea's Strategic Importance

The Korean peninsula has traditionally been a strategic concern of Chinese security. It shares a border not only with China and Russia but is significantly close to the shores of Japan. Historically, Korea has been an invasion corridor and a center of conflict for the three countries. It was from Korean shores that the Mongols launched their unsuccessful invasions in 1271 and 1274 on Japan. Korea resisted the Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1597 by Hideyoshi in an attempt to conquer Ming China through the Korean Peninsula. The resistance of the Righteous Volunteer Army against these forces was to protect the king and the nation. Admiral Yi became Korea's premier national hero by defeating over 250 Japanese vessels with his newly developed ironclads forcing the invaders to retreat due to lack of supply lines. The Manchu invasions in 1627 and 1637 followed the Japanese invasions, completing the economic disruption of the nation. Greater animosity against the regime led to isolation as devastation in the northwest provinces took its toll on the Korean people who were dedicated to the preservation of their nation state.

The 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War was a watershed in the history of Chinese international relations. This war marked the defeat of China as the "Middle Kingdom" and served as a wake up call for national modernization. Japanese victory over China established a foothold on the continent from which Japan launched its expansion into Manchuria. As previously discussed (Chapter II), Korea had remained a relatively "Hermit Kingdom" up until the end of the nineteenth century. Korea was intent on being separate and distinct from other nations defending its borders against the French and the

⁴ Yi, Wu-song, "The Development of Orthodoxy on the part of the Kunki School in the late Yi Dynasty", *Journal of History*, 31, pg. 174-175, in *The Identity of the Korean People*, Young-soo Kim, 1983, pg. 21.

Americans in the late 19th century. The arrival of the foreigners aroused anti-foreign reactions and sparked the rise of the nativist religion, Tonghak or "Eastern Learning." The Tonghaks sought to revitalize Confucian's five relationships and loyalty to the monarch as well as replace the Sino-centric Asia with a new outlook towards Asia as part of a larger international system. The decline of Chinese superiority provided Korea the opportunity to become both politically and philosophically independent.⁵

The Japanese pressured Korea into signing the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876, thus opening up Korea, leading to mutual treaties with the Western powers. In 1894, China was suffering from foreign wars and internal rebellion. Japan's military leaders saw the opportunity for hegemony in East Asia. Peasants, tired of corruption, exploitation and inflated taxes revolted in Cholla province. The Tonghak rebellion, similar to China's Taiping and Boxer rebellions in its nationalistic ideals, erupted in 1894. Both China and Japan sent military troops into Korea to aid the Korean government to suppress the rebellion in accordance with the Tientsin Treaty. Neither country showed any inclination to withdraw troops at the conclusion of the revolt. The Sino-Japanese War broke out as Japan aggressively attempted to gain political control of Korea (see Chapter I). The humiliating defeat of China by the sword of Japan severed the close relationship between China and Korea until 1950.

It was from Korea that Japan launched its aggressive campaign into China's northeast provinces prior to the Second World War (Chapter II). The loss of Manchuria, in 1931, by the Chinese Nationalists meant a loss of revenue and the chance to unify the northern provinces. The seizing of Manchuria was essential for Japan's "continental policy" but fueled Chinese hostility against an imperialist Japan. The Manchurian incident marked the beginning of Japanese aggression on the road to the Second World War. Japan's declaration of the New Order in East Asia was in China's eyes an opportunity to defeat China and establish Japanese hegemony over the entire region. Conversely, Japan saw it as a means of returning China to East Asia.

⁵ Lee, Chong-sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 1963, pg. 22.

Korea's geographical location has made it a "buffer" for China and a staging area for regional conflict. For these reasons, the Korean Peninsula has been and will continue to be a significant factor in Chinese security. Traditionally, Chinese leaders have sought to maintain Korea in China's sphere of influence or prevent other countries from gaining hegemony on the peninsula. More recently, the Korean War, which will be discussed in a later section, proved the PRC's determination in preventing what it considered a hostile imperialist power from gaining control over the peninsula. The PRC found it necessary to preserve its own security and territorial integrity by engaging the United States in 1950.

B. THE PRC'S COLD WAR RELATIONS WITH KOREA

The confrontation between the two Koreas has served as central point in foreign relations since the end of the Second World War. Both sides have competed for legitimacy in the international environment. Despite the strong ideological difference between the DPRK and the ROK, the one factor that is common to the policy of both is the force of Korean nationalism, exemplified in the desire for national reunification. The unique aspect of Korea is that nationalism is a unifying force internally but a centrifugal force globally following its reunification. The PRC has played a large role in the policies of both Koreas since the outbreak of the Korean War. Moreover, the PRC has been able to utilize its diplomatic position to benefit its national interests and play off the dominance of the United States and Japan in the region.

1. North Korea and the PRC

China's close ties to the Korean peninsula were cemented following Chinese involvement in the Korean War. These ties, however, were established prior to the outbreak of the war through Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung had emigrated to Manchuria to attend Chinese middle school. In 1931, he fled to the hills of Manchuria to join the communist guerrillas to fight the Japanese occupying Manchuria. He remained a Communist guerrilla with several Korean comrades for eight to ten years. He advanced through the ranks of the Chinese Communist military to commander, operating along the Korean border. In 1949 and 1950 the Korean People's Army was composed of at least thirty thousand Korean soldiers who had fought with the People's Liberation Army in

China after the 1949 defeat of the Kuomintang in mainland China. Approximately eighty percent of the officers in the KPA of that period served with Chinese forces. The all Korean Sixth Army, which had fought with the Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, had participated in its march from Manchuria to Hainan Island and comprised a large portion of the North Korean army's most experienced fighters.⁶

The Korean peninsula has traditionally been a security concern for China. The relationship between the two has been marked by close political, military, and economic ties. If an adversary ever gained control of this region, China would lose any security buffer to its regions to the north. This concern was evident in 1949 before the outbreak of the Korean War. The South Korean government, established in 1948 under American influence, was termed "the running dog of American imperialism in the Korean Peninsula" by the Chinese as it recognized Taiwan alone. The Chinese government recognized North Korea under close alliance with the Soviet Union and was deemed "the Soviet chief satellite in East Asia" by the South Koreans.⁷ The United States had supplied large amounts of weapons to the nationalists throughout the civil war, therefore, the PRC's alignment with the Soviet Union would further strengthen the socialist camp preventing any intervention of the United States in Taiwan or in China unless it was willing to risk a third world war.

Kim Il-sung desired the reunification of the Korean peninsula under his rule. The Soviet Union possibly sought the acquisition of warm water ports in the east. Neither country expected United States' involvement in the conflict since a statement made by Secretary of State Dean Acheson specifically left South Korea out of the United States' defense perimeter. Conflict between the United States and the PRC began when the United States decided to use its forces to reunify the peninsula under Seoul's authority. Chou Enlai warned that if American forces entered North Korea, China would enter the war. When forces approached the Yalu river, the PRC's warnings became increasingly

⁶ Clough, Ralph, *Embattled Korea, The Rivalry for International Support*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pg. 1, 17, and 259.

⁷ Kim, Hakjoon, "The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese Diplomatic Relations: A South Korean Perspective," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, XIII, no. 2, Summer 1994, pg. 32.

hostile. The PRC's greatest fear was that if the United States' forces were not halted, imperialist forces would be stationed along the Yalu, threatening Manchuria. Moreover, Chinese leaders were very conscious of earlier events when Japanese soldiers used Korea as the beginning of its advance into Manchuria in the quest for a Japanese Pacific empire. On November 26, 1950 two hundred thousand Chinese People's Volunteers entered the conflict in force, stabilizing a front line on the thirty-eighth parallel. As a result of the conflict the Chinese lost approximately 900,000 soldiers.⁸ The alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang was forged during the Korean War. According to Beijing, the war was a success. It was the first occasion in modern history when Chinese forces successfully held out against Western forces and claimed victory by their ability to drive these armies back to the 38th parallel.

The year 1945 marked the liberation of Korea from Japanese influence at the conclusion of World War II. However, efforts to build a unified nation dissolved with the outbreak of the Korean War. Both Koreas set out to build separate states, establish legitimacy and promote economic development for their state. North Korea sought alliance with the Soviet Union and China. The PRC and the Soviet Union both established a Mutual Defense treaty with the DPRK in 1961 forming the "Northern Triangle." Conversely, South Korea joined the United States and Japan forming the "Southern Triangle," to achieve its national interests. Because Seoul decided to side with the "imperialists," Sino-South Korean ties were virtually non-existent. Within the Socialist camp, both the Soviet Union and the PRC fought for the loyalty of North Korea. Kim Il Sung was partial to the PRC due to his schooling in China and experiences in the Chinese Communist guerrilla wars in Manchuria. Moreover, the PRC's entering the Korean War to preserve the DPRK's existence enhanced Sino-North Korean relations. When the relationship between Beijing and Moscow remained strong, North Korea's decision making was based on the close relationships of the "Northern Triangle." However, in 1956, Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate, complicating Pyongyang's foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet conflict... "forced North Korean leaders to choose between the

⁸ Garver, John, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, 1993, pg. 286-289.

two powers...at a time when they could not afford to alienate either.”⁹ Pyongyang decided to straddle the fence from 1956-1961, utilizing both powers to obtain leverage to develop its scientific, military, and industrial capabilities.¹⁰ Kim Il-Sung’s primary concern was the development of the DPRK’s economy. North Korea emulated the economic policies of China’s Great Leap forward, but needed aid from both the Soviet Union and the PRC. Diplomatic exchanges continued as the DPRK accepted Zhou Enlai’s visit in 1958 and Kim Il Sung returned the visit in the same year. The PRC, unhappy with the Soviet Union’s lack of support, felt that Moscow was trying to prevent China’s emergence as a world power. North Korea maintained its “middle of the road” status until hostility between Moscow and Beijing forced greater competition for North Korean allegiance.

By 1962, North Korea was firmly entrenched on the side of the PRC concerning its international relations with the socialist countries. North Korea was suspicious of Moscow’s recent policies regarding the PRC, its lack of support for China’s policy against India, Moscow’s role in the Sino-Indian dispute, and its commitment to socialism. This led to a significant decrease in Soviet aid to Pyongyang. China, viewing the Soviet Union as a potential threat, sought to keep North Korea from becoming another Soviet satellite. China had always had closer military ties with the DPRK than the Soviets due to its participation in the Korean War and the training of troops under the Fourth Field Army during the Chinese civil war. The PRC, unable to provide economic assistance like the Soviet Union, sought closer relations with North Korea through military and political measures.

China’s Cultural Revolution, (1966-1969), marked the lowest level in Sino-North Korean relations. China’s policies were more focused on domestic upheavals and the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought. North Korea, expressed its disdain for this revolutionary policy and Red Guard violence. Economic and cultural exchanges declined

⁹ Chung, Chin, *Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea’s Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975*, (University of Alabama, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978), pg. 26.

¹⁰ Koh, Byung Chul, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), pg. 204-210, and “China and the Korean Peninsula,” *Korea and World Affairs*, 9, no. 2, 1985, pg. 255-259.

in the upcoming propaganda battle between the the PRC and the DPRK. Red Guards called Kim Il Sung a "fat revisionist."¹¹ Pyongyang swung to the Soviet side in the face of reduced contacts with the PRC, although it did not swing all the way. In 1966, the DPRK indicated its independent foreign policy regarding Beijing and Moscow. The conclusion of the Cultural Revolution set the stage for an improvement in Sino-North Korean relations. North Korea did not comment on the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1969, and the DPRK delegation visit to Beijing to celebrate the PRC's twentieth anniversary. Furthermore, as Soviet expansion increased, the PRC became concerned over the possibility of Soviet bases in North Korean territory. By alienating North Korea from China, Moscow would be one step closer in encircling China. Chou Enlai visited the DPRK in 1970 to promote greater relations and denounce the rise of Japanese militarism pronounced by the Nixon-Sato communiqué.

The debate continues over whether North Korea was adept at playing the two powers off against each other from a position of weakness or whether it was merely reacting to the policies of the larger dynamic. As animosity grew between Moscow and Beijing, both countries competed for the loyalty of the DPRK. However, the DPRK was more of a strategic priority for the PRC rather than the Soviet Union. Once Pyongyang increased its criticisms of Soviet policy, the Soviet Union shut off its economic assistance and focused its attention on Eastern Europe. North Korea's alignment with the PRC, during the early 1960s, was primarily based on common interests and needs at the time. Both the PRC and the DPRK shared similar outlooks on the world, complaints against the United States, and style of Communist dictatorship. In 1964, North Korea needed to modernize its military and obtain economic assistance for its development, therefore, it turned to a more non-aligned posture regarding its socialist partners. Pyongyang increased relations with Moscow when Beijing was unable to provide economic assistance. True, North Korea utilized Sino-Soviet tensions to gain more autonomy, but Pyongyang needed the PRC and the Soviet Union much more than they needed it.

¹¹ Clough, Ralph, *Embattled Korea, The Rivalry for International Support*, 1987, pg. 266.

Seeking to check Soviet aggression and possible hegemony in the region, the PRC normalized relations with the United States and Japan. Beijing was very careful not to alienate the DPRK following the establishment of the united front with the United States. The PRC's realignment in the strategic triangle forced the DPRK to reevaluate its foreign policy goals. Chinese leaders appeased North Korean apprehension with an increase in economic, technical, and military aid agreements. Since its foremost ally and worst enemy had moved towards normalization, Pyongyang had to make a move on its own. North Korea proposed talks with South Korea resulting in the 1972 Joint Communiqué calling for upholding three principles of reunification; an independent solution without the interference of external forces; peaceful reunification; and great national unity.¹² In 1975, Kim Il Sung visited the PRC to strengthen support for the peaceful reunification of Korea resulting in the PRC's recognition of the DPRK as the "sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation."

During this period, trade with North Korea increased steadily. By 1978, trade with China had grown to twenty percent of North Korea's total trade, making mainland China the DPRK's second most important trading partner.¹³ Beijing also trained technicians to assist in various industrial fields. In 1976, the Chinese completed a pipeline to the Korean border and assisted in building the Ponghwa petroleum refinery. Since the mid-1970s, China had sold crude oil to the North at a "friendship rate" as prices rose and the Soviets demanded an increase in the price of their oil. The death of Mao Zedong, the downgrading of his cult of personality, and the 1978 Friendship Treaty with Japan, gave some concern to the DPRK regime. However, from 1979 to 1985 there was an increase in the amount of diplomatic exchanges between Beijing and Pyongyang, signifying the commitment of both regimes to continued amicable relations.

In 1982, Beijing moved away from its position next to the United States toward an equidistant policy of peaceful coexistence with both superpowers. As the PRC shifted its

¹² Eggleston, Karen, "Chinese and Korean Foreign Policy Goals and Sino-Korean Relations," *Korea Observer*, XXIII, no. 3, 1992, pg. 322.

¹³ Clough, Ralph, *Embattled Korea, The Rivalry for International Support*, 1987, pg. 264.

emphasis regarding relations with United States and the Soviet Union, its policy toward the Korean Peninsula underwent a significant change as well. Deng Xiaoping emphasized modernization and economic advancement for the PRC. Deng and Hu Yaobang visited the DPRK in 1982 to congratulate Kim Il Sung on his seventieth birthday. The return visit of Kim Il Sung to Beijing was the most important visit during that year. Kim stated, "Korea-China friendship is an invincible one which no force can ever break. It will further flourish down through generations." Hu Yaobang assured Kim that no matter what may happen in the world in the future, the Chinese people will invariably stand foursquare behind the Korean people as in the past and support the Korean people's just cause of socialist construction and the independent and peaceful reunification of the country."¹⁴ Beijing later transferred forty A-5 fighter aircraft to North Korea increasing North Korea's inventory to 180 Chinese manufactured MIG-19s.¹⁵ During this same year, Deng issued the independent foreign policy for the PRC, seeking peaceful coexistence with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Economic development had become the primary concern of the PRC, therefore, increased defense expenditures due to a hostile Soviet Union was not in the PRC's best interest. Since 1983, North Korea had stepped up its contacts with the Soviet Union as PRC relations with Japan and the United States became more complex. Both the Soviet Union and North Korea had concern over an emerging Japan-U.S.-China entente which could lead to greater cooperation in the future. Following the Rangoon bombing, Beijing did not publicly acknowledge Pyongyang's responsibility but made it clear that it would not support armed aggression or an increase in hostilities to reunify the peninsula. In 1984-1985, the PRC frequently promoted the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula which was considered in their best interest to pursue economic advancement. Beijing sponsored trilateral talks between the two Koreas and the United States as well as inter-Korean dialogue. The PRC became actively involved in promoting stability in Korea and increased its contacts with South Korea. Despite the need for modernization, the PRC remained firmly tied to Pyongyang. Strong

¹⁴Koh, Byung Chul, "China and the Korean Peninsula," *Korea and World Affairs*, 9, no. 2, 1985, pg. 266.

¹⁵ Ibid., pg. 274.

ties were essential if the PRC was to persuade North Korea from using force or forging a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. The PRC increasingly sent diplomats to North Korea as well as military hardware to assure Pyongyang of its importance to Beijing. Mainland China also denounced the "cross recognition" proposals and the Korea's dual admission to the UN which Beijing felt would promote division on the peninsula.

2. South Korea and the PRC

It was only after the monumental Sino-American rapprochement in 1972 that South Korea reconsidered its relations with the PRC. With the relaxation of the political constraints surrounding the peninsula, South Korea adjusted its foreign policy towards the Communist countries. On June 23, 1973, President Park Chung Hee announced South Korea's intention to establish relations with all socialist countries, including the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The notion of "cross recognition," in which China and the Soviet Union would recognize South Korea while the United States and Japan would recognize North Korea, was central to the declaration. However, both the PRC and the DPRK felt that this notion would perpetuate a divided Korea.¹⁶ Beijing's change in posture regarding economic relations in the post-Mao era led to increased contacts with South Korea. However, indirect unofficial trade between the two countries had occurred in the late 1970s primarily through intermediaries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. By 1984, South Korean vessels were reaching Chinese ports bringing consumer goods such as televisions, radios and textiles into China. Chinese officials also maintained an interest in South Korean development strategy. In 1986, bilateral commerce through Hong Kong increased to 646 million dollars, total trade between the two countries, if direct trade between Pusan and Shanghai is included, was estimated at 1.2 billion dollars. The PRC's bilateral trade with North Korea totaled only 515 million dollars.¹⁷ To South Korea, China was seen as a huge market with abundant

¹⁶ Kim, Hakjoon, "The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese Diplomatic Relations: A South Korean Perspective," 1994, pg. 32.

¹⁷ Levin, Norman, "Evolving Chinese and Soviet Policies Toward the Korean Peninsula," in *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. June Dreyer and Ilpyong Kim, (New York, NY: Paragon House, 1988), pg. 189.

natural resources and a cheap labor force. In order to turn indirect, unofficial trade into direct trade, the establishment of diplomatic relations was essential.

The breakthrough in Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations occurred in 1983 when a Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) plane was hijacked by six Chinese youths and forced to land in South Korea. A delegation was sent to Seoul and for the first time representatives from the PRC and the ROK conducted direct negotiations. The signing of a memorandum, the official agreement between the two countries on this issue, cited the official names of the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China.¹⁸

Diplomatic and sports exchanges increased following the first official contact. A South Korean tennis team competed in China and a Chinese basketball team and swimming team competed in Seoul. The Rangoon bombing incident by North Korea prompted Beijing to speak out against this form of terror. Deng stated, "China wanted to help achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula."¹⁹ The PRC was clearly opposed to any actions that may increase instability in Korea.

President Roh Tae-woo launched his 1988 "Northern Policy," *Nordpolitik*, in an effort to obtain the PRC's and the Soviet Union's support for the opening of diplomatic relations and the reunification of the two Koreas.²⁰ Roh's *Nordpolitik* was similar to West Germany's 1970s policy of *Ostpolitik* toward the Eastern European states, which was pursued by West Germany's Socialist Chancellor, Willy Brandt. Roh's aid, Park Chul-un, summarized the goals of the *Nordpolitik*; "The Northern Policy is designed to advance the date of realizing peace and unification, which is the solemn task of our era. It is also aimed at establishing national self esteem, building a prosperous future, and making the twenty-first century ours." Unlike the previous policies, Roh's policy sought common

¹⁸ Ibid., pg. 275.

¹⁹ *New York Times*, 12 October 1984.

²⁰ For a more detailed analysis of Roh's *Nordpolitik*, see Ahn, Byung-Joon, "South Korea's New *Nordpolitik*", Park, Sang-Seek, "Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korea Relations," Chee, Choung-II, "South Korea's Foreign Policy in Transition," *Korea and World Affairs*, 12, no. 4, 1988, and Kim, Hak-Joon, "The Republic of Korea's Northern Policy: Origin, Development, and Prospects," in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton, 1993.

prosperity for both Koreas by helping North Korea improve relations with noncommunist countries.²¹ The road to reunification would be found in the prosperity of both nations through cooperation in the international community.

There were several reasons for South Korea to actively seek normalization with the PRC: the changing international setting evidenced by the emerging détente in Sino-Soviet and American-Soviet relations, democratization in South Korea, the 1988 Olympics, and South Korean trade surpluses, led to the shift in ROK foreign policy. South Korea would also gain significant political advantages. Establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, South Korea would enhance its status in international politics. In South Korea's eyes, the PRC was considered one of the four major players in world politics by holding a seat in the United Nations Security Council. The PRC had concluded a military agreement with North Korea to counter the American-South Korean mutual defense treaty of 1953. If relations between the South and the PRC improved, the PRC would be balanced in its position regarding North-South relations, thus, weakening its military alliance with the DPRK. Roh was seeking a more independent international role for a more confident and economically prosperous South Korea. While improving relations with the Communist countries, Roh sought to establish a more equal partnership with the United States and Japan.²² Finally, the PRC was seen as a large market with abundant resources and a cheap labor force.²³ In order to foster direct trade, establishment of official relations was essential. It was not until 1990 that the PRC responded to Roh's initiative. The process of normalization between the PRC and South

²¹ Previous policies were aimed at preventing another war and forcing North Korea to endorse Seoul's unification strategy by improving South Korean relations with China and the Soviet Union and weakening Pyongyang's alliances. This strategy, weakening North Korea's relationships with its primary allies in order to achieve political superiority, generated suspicion in the PRC, Soviet Union, and North Korea. See Kim, Hakjoon, "The Republic of Korea's Northern Policy: Origin, Development, and Prospects," 1993, pg. 256.

²² South Korea pursued this policy from a position of national confidence and strength. Much like the West German policy of *Ostpolitik* was pursued under the NATO security umbrella, South Korea's policy was shadowed by its alliance with the United States.

²³ Kim, Hakjoon, "The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese Diplomatic Relations: A South Korean Perspective," 1994, pg. 34.

Korea began when Beijing sent athletes to compete in the 1986 Asian Games and in the 1988 24th Olympic Games in Seoul. Following the games, South Korean officials were invited to take place in trade fairs and conferences in China. The sea lanes between Pusan and Inchon, and Shanghai and Dairen, were opened for trade indicating the PRC's interests in economic relations with South Korea.²⁴ PRC negotiations with South Korea were clearly an indication of the Chinese emphasis on economic growth through one of the most successful East Asian NICs. The ROK's *Nordpolitik* was seen as a means to maintain the principle that separated politics from economics. The PRC could stick to its political alliance with the DPRK while expanding economic relations with the ROK. Seoul represented a market for Chinese goods and a source of technology and consumer products. Despite the increased contact with the ROK, the PRC maintained its ideological commitment to the DPRK. This was evident when Beijing induced strict trade regulations in 1982-83 at Pyongyang's request and increased military sales to the DPRK.²⁵

C. THE PRC'S POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS WITH KOREA

1. Beijing's "Two Track" Korea Policy

Beijing's emphasis on modernization and a peaceful international environment impacted its relations with both Koreas. The PRC continued its trend of the late 1980s in promoting a peaceful and stable peninsula, however, Chinese foreign policy concerning Korea had significantly diverged into a "two Korea" policy. The significant event that occurred in 1991 was the decision of Pyongyang to apply for a separate UN membership. Since the 1970s, Seoul had been advocating dual membership but was opposed by North Korea and its two supporters; the Soviet Union and the PRC. According to Pyongyang officials, separate admission to the UN would prolong the national division of the peninsula. The sudden change in Pyongyang's position clearly revolved around the fall of

²⁴ Kim, Ilpyong, "The Normalization of Chinese-South Korean Diplomatic Relations", *Korea and World Affairs*, 16, no. 3, 1992, pg. 485.

²⁵ Jia, Hao, and Zhuang, Qubing, "China's Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Survey*, XXXII, no. 12, December 1992, pg. 1144

the Soviet Union. Russia, now primarily concerned with domestic issues and a more open policy with Seoul, was no longer in the position to back the DPRK based on merely ideological grounds. Beijing made it clear to Pyongyang that it would no longer veto Seoul's application for membership before the Security Council. According to Beijing, vetoing Seoul's application would only hurt its relations in the international arena when it was seeking a more peaceful and good neighborly approach towards global issues. Moreover, vetoing Seoul's application would also injure relations with Seoul when the PRC was seeking a more active economic relationship to support its Four Modernizations program. North Korea, losing support from a disinterested Russia and a reform oriented PRC, had no choice but to go along with dual application to the UN. Failing to apply for separate membership would not only further alienate Pyongyang from international politics but increase Seoul's lead in the race for diplomatic recognition.

The PRC maintained trade relations with the two Koreas, however, its policies were remarkably different. The one sided trade relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang was based exclusively on political and ideological considerations. Economic interests of the PRC led to a change in PRC-DPRK economic relations. The PRC attempted to reduce the economic burden of aid to Pyongyang as the Soviet influence in the DPRK declined. Trade declined from 562 million dollars in 1989 to 483 million in 1990.²⁶ Beijing also promoted the opening up of relations with the United States and Japan.

Following the Tiananmen episode, the PRC sought to strengthen relations with surrounding countries. In 1990, both the PRC and ROK agreed to establish trade offices in each other's capitals. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation signed a joint trade pact in Beijing granting most favored nation status on bilateral trade. Trade between the PRC and South Korea expanded. Trade increased from 3.8 billion in 1990 to 5.8 billion in 1991. South Korea ranked as China's eighth largest trading partner. By the end of 1991, 185 South Korean companies had gained permission to invest in China, amounting to a total investment of

²⁶ Ibid., 1143

more than 900 million dollars.²⁷ South Korea was also a mediator in the PRC's joining of APEC along with Taiwan and Hong Kong. South Korea responded to the initiatives of the PRC primarily due to a decade of global protectionism that hurt its export oriented economy. Seoul was forced to further open its domestic markets to foreign merchandise. Increased trade relations with the PRC would help diversify South Korea's external markets.

The PRC's regional foreign policy shift had directly affected its relations with the Korean Peninsula. Beijing clearly defined a "two Korea" policy with the demise of the Soviet Union. In advancing its policy with the South, Beijing was particularly careful regarding its relations with Pyongyang. Chinese policy makers attempted to strike a balance between both sides on the peninsula for fear of isolating North Korea which would cause instability in the region.

2. South Korea's Normalization with the PRC

In August of 1992, both South Korea and China reopened diplomatic relations after four decades of hostility. It was during the Korean War that China chose to send troops to counter the UN forces and despite the cease fire, tense relations between the two countries persisted. In 1949, North Korea maintained diplomatic ties to the PRC while South Korea maintained relations with the ROC in Taiwan, until the recent recognition by South Korea respecting the PRC as the sole government of China. Clearly, the PRC will benefit with the increased opening of trade relations with South Korea and the officials of both countries are not blind to the advantages. Mainland China primarily imports machinery and appliances, capital intensive, high technology items, from South Korea while South Korea imports coal, oil, cement, and farm produce, labor intensive items. More recently, the two countries signed a Temporary Aviation Agreement, Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Power Agreement, and established a council for the increased cooperation in aviation, automobiles, digital systems, and high tech televisions. Trade, during the first half of 1994, was 5.45 billion dollars, estimated to reach 12 billion

²⁷ Ibid., pg. 1143-1146.

dollars at the close of the year and expected to be sustained through 1997.²⁸ This makes the PRC the third largest trading partner of South Korea after the United States and Japan. South Korean investment, that includes negotiations with 612 Chinese enterprises, is expected to reach 1 billion dollars by the end of 1995. Furthermore, the increase in trade relations reduces the PRC's economic dependency on Japan and the United States, which continues to link its trade policies to human rights issues. South Korea seeks to gain from the normalization through the increased foreign investment projects. Deng Xiaoping's reform policies have created a greater avenue for Korean investors who seek China's low cost, high quality labor force compared to other nations. Recently, South Korea has expanded its investment into electronics, cement, steel, automobiles, petrochemicals, and construction. China's geographical proximity and its two million ethnic Koreans make favorable conditions for South Korean firms.²⁹

Diplomatic relations, reflecting increased regional stability, have coincided with the increase in economic ties. Premier Li Peng emphasizes a stable environment in East Asia in order to achieve China's long term development goals. Therefore, separating politics from economics with the ROK, is a necessity. A year and one half of talks culminated in the signing of a joint communiqué between the South Korean Foreign Minister, Lee Sang-ock and Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen. In this agreement, the governments of the two countries would "develop the enduring relations of good neighborhood, friendship, and cooperation on the basis of the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations." Also incorporated were the five principles of peaceful coexistence. However, the most important section dealt with Taiwan, "The government of the Republic of Korea recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and respects the Chinese position that there is but one China and

²⁸ "Li's Trip Promotes Ties with ROK," *Beijing Review*, 37, no. 46, 14-20 November 1994.

²⁹ Suh, Jang Won, "South Korea-China Economic Relations: Trends and Prospects," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Winter 1994, pg. 26-28 and Han, Guajian, "ROK Traders Pour Into China," *Beijing Review*, 36, no. 25, 21-27 June 1993, pg 23.

Taiwan is part of China."³⁰ Since the UN recognizes Taiwan as part of China, and there is only one China in the UN, South Korea had to sever its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in order to establish official ties with Beijing. In post-Cold War East Asia, the political, strategic, and economic relations between Beijing and Seoul have placed the PRC in a no lose situation; a position it has sought since 1910.

President Yang Shangkun, in 1992, expressed his feelings that "China and the ROK... have cherished close contacts in history and share a similar cultural heritage," the establishment of official ties is in the interests of both peoples and is conducive to peace, stability, and development in Northeast Asia as a whole.³¹ Mainland China, however, maintains a friendly relationship and its military security alliance with North Korea. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the PRC is the only ally for the DPRK in the region. Beijing needs to convince Pyongyang that normalization with the South is necessary in the post-Cold War environment. North Korea cannot afford to break its ties with the PRC which supports it politically, militarily, and economically. Despite the normalization with South Korea, the PRC must maintain close ties with the DPRK in order to act as a broker between the two nations. During the process of normalization with the ROK, Chinese policymakers kept the DPRK informed and indicated that it would help the DPRK forge greater relations with Japan and the United States so it would not feel betrayed by the normalization. If the PRC simply abandoned the North, Pyongyang's leaders might feel backed into a corner and respond militarily which would be detrimental to the security and economic goals of the region. North Korea, having witnessed PRC-ROK normalization, may feel that the PRC is in favor of the status quo rather than the reunification of the peninsula under a DPRK regime. The ROK sees the PRC as a necessary leg in the support of a "wobbling" North Korea. Without Chinese assistance, North Korea will collapse creating a financial and social disaster on the present South Korean society. Furthermore,

³⁰ Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of the Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, Beijing, August 24, 1992, *Korea and World Affairs*, 16, no. 3, pg. 544.

³¹ "Sino-ROK Ties Praised," *Beijing Review*, 35, no. 41, 12-18 October 1992, pg. 7.

Seoul has sought the PRC's assistance in reunification and denuclearization issues, which cannot be done without Beijing's close ties to Pyongyang.

3. Post-Cold War Chinese National Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions

The conduct of China's foreign policy has been promoting national economic development and a peaceful, stable international environment. As the PRC has become more focused on regional issues, these two cornerstones have become essential in the tensions concerning the Korean Peninsula. There are three possible outcomes concerning the situation between the Koreas: the status quo; increased tension leading to the outbreak of war; and a reunified Korea. Each of these possible scenarios will directly affect the PRC's national interest. However, since the PRC maintains diplomatic ties with both Koreas, it is in the unique position to influence the outcome on the peninsula more so than the United States or Japan. The following section will outline the scenarios for Korean reunification and their affects on Chinese security. The gradual reunification of the peninsula will be in the best interest of Beijing. Once reunified, the resulting Korean state, either strong or weak, will be a primary concern of the PRC.

Beijing does not feel any direct military threat from Korea as it maintains amicable relations with both halves of the peninsula. Chinese leaders have indicated that the outbreak of war or increased tensions between the two Koreas is not in the best interest of peace and stability in the region and, therefore, not in the PRC's interest. Jiang Zemin, the Chinese President commenting on the North Korean nuclear issue stated; "Without peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, there will be no peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region." His view was echoed by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, "Tension on the Korean Peninsula would bring no benefit to any country in the region."³² The resumption of hostilities would clearly hinder Beijing's pursuit to devote all its resources towards economic modernization and reform. A North Korean attack, either conventional or nuclear would place China in a difficult position regarding its relations with Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo. Increased aggression by North Korea, particularly nuclear,

³² "China and ROK Make Plea for Peace," *Beijing Review*, 37, no. 15, 11-17 April 1994, pg 4.

would lead to a possible nuclear Japan that would directly challenge China's role in the region. Large numbers of refugees could flow into Northeast China as a result of an invasion of North Korea further complicating the PRC's political and economic standing.

Because conflict is not in the best interest of China, prevention of conflict is the next logical step, thus encouraging the status quo. Fear of increased tension has caused the PRC to go to great lengths in assuring a balanced relationship with the two Koreas. As previously stated, Beijing has the greater leverage on the Korean Peninsula due to its contacts with both South and North Korea. Despite its contacts with the North, Beijing has repeatedly called for peaceful means and the necessity of a long process of to solve the reunification issue. By promoting the status quo, the PRC can avoid any possible deterioration in its relations with the capitalist countries that would be detrimental to its economic development. Moreover, promoting the status quo, with reduced tensions, provides the PRC with leverage against the United States at a time when Washington is continually cracking down on PRC human rights violations. Beijing has continually sought reconciliation dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul. Beijing called for both Koreas "to refrain from taking any acts that might impede détente on the peninsula and a peaceful reunification of Korea."³³ China can continue to promote economic reform for North Korea and emphasize "cross recognition" between the DPRK and Japan and the United States, thus, opening up North Korea to the West and easing its isolation from the international community. Regarding the nuclear issue, the PRC is in favor of a nuclear free peninsula but will not force Pyongyang to give up its nuclear projects. The solution to the problem, according to Vice Premier Li Lanqing, should be through dialogue in which China's role will be in accordance with its policies and principles, thus, limiting the PRC's direct interference.³⁴ According to Beijing, collective action by the United Nations could provoke the North into irrational action.

Due to the status of the North Korean economy and polity, it is more than likely that the peninsula will be reunified under South Korean democracy. There are three

³³ Sino-Soviet Communiqué, *Beijing Review*, May 27-June 2, 1991.

³⁴ "Trouble in the East," *Time*, 143, no. 13, 28 March 1994, pg 42.

means of reunification; the first is through conflict; the second by rapid absorption; and the last is through gradual assimilation. All three of these possible reunification measures will affect the PRC's position in the region. Reunification by conflict would be highly threatening to the PRC's national security and economic modernization as previously discussed. Rapid absorption of the North by the South is in neither the best interest of Beijing nor Seoul. Any sudden union of the peninsula would bring large short term costs to the South. The rapid collapse of the North would require financial assistance to assume the burden of rebuilding the DPRK's infrastructure. This type of reunification would not only setback the South Korean economy, thus, weakening a reunified state, but would hurt the PRC's advancement, that is depending on South Korean trade and investment to limit its economic dependence on Japan. Furthermore, any capital assistance required, due to the sudden collapse of the North, would most likely come from Japan. This would increase Japan's hold on regional economic superiority and facilitate its ability to seek a greater role in regional security. An increase in Japanese regional influence is not in Beijing's best interest. Moreover, the sudden demise of the Communist regime in the DPRK would send shock waves affecting the power base of the Chinese Communists in the middle of economic reform.

The gradual reunification of the peninsula would be the best scenario for the PRC. Reunification over a period of time would allow for the possible opening and strengthening of the North Korean economy, reducing the economic trauma after reunification. South Korea and the PRC have sought to open the DPRK to the West through "cross recognition." Officials from both countries have considered the assimilation of Hong Kong by China in 1997, in which Hong Kong's economy has been meshed with the PRC, as a model for Korea.³⁵ The sponsoring of special economic zones and the Tumen River project are viable means for advancing the DPRK's national economy. The longer it takes for reunification, the more time the PRC has to develop its national economy which would strengthen the Chinese leadership's position and increase the possibility of returning capital assistance following eventual reunification. The lesser

³⁵ "A China Model for Reunification," *World Press Review*, 41, no. 9, September 1994, pg. 20.

the financial burden on Seoul, the better the chances for stable investment and trade with Beijing.

Having determined that a gradually reunified Korea is in the PRC's best interest, the question remains what does a reunified Korea mean to the PRC?³⁶ Currently, the PRC maintains the advantage of dialogue with both Korean states. By being the sole influence in both Koreas, the PRC will be able to enhance the possibility of closer ties upon reunification. An economically sound, reunified Korea will be beneficial to China's growing economy. Furthermore, the absence of tension in the region would provide for a more stable environment allowing for increased economic ventures rather than defense expenditures. An amicable reunified Korea-PRC relationship will counteract the growing economic dominance of Japan. Any economic and strategic cooperation between the PRC and Korea will constrain Japan's ability to upgrade its regional standing compatible with its economic power. China and both Koreas share a common history of Japanese aggression that will continue to shadow future issues concerning Japan.

The previous outline describing the scenarios of Korean reunification has assumed that the PRC would continue on its road to economic reform; this is the most likely scenario that this paper has tried to emphasize. However, the possibility exists that the PRC may suffer domestic tensions or falter in its economic advancement creating a weaker PRC in the future. A weak PRC may have an entirely different view of a strong reunified Korea. It is not out of the question to assume that a confident, resource rich, militarily strong Korea, would pose a threat to a less resilient PRC. A nationalistic Korea could reassert itself in the region and possibly seek to reacquire territory in northern Manchuria that it once considered Korean. This type of Korea, against a weaker PRC, would also change the regional security dynamic opposing Japan.

³⁶ A reunified Korea will also harbor interests for the reunification of China. Presently, South Korea and North Korea do not recognize Taiwan, therefore, a reunified Korea with significant economic interests in the PRC would probably do the same. Korea would promote unofficial trade with Taiwan and seek diplomatic means to solve China's reunification issue.

4. Post-Cold War Korean National Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions

Both North and South Korea maintain similar perceptions of the PRC. Neither Korea regards the PRC as a direct threat to its own security. Pyongyang and Seoul see the PRC as a counterweight to those nations that may pose a threat around them. The PRC's support of the DPRK gives Pyongyang greater leverage against United States' initiatives. The recent normalization between the PRC and the ROK reduces South Korea's apprehension over possible North Korean irrationality and a possible remilitarized Japan. Despite the stronger foundation that the PRC provides to the policies of the two Koreas, neither state can be certain of Beijing's reliability.³⁷ PRC-ROK normalization has generated suspicion in Pyongyang over Beijing's commitment to a reunified Korea under DPRK conditions, now that the Soviet Union is no longer a reliable partner. Conversely, the 1961 PRC-DPRK military alliance and Beijing's lack of pressure on the North's nuclear development have caused suspicions in Seoul.

The PRC seeks to become a decisive regional power in which the development of its national economy is crucial to its reputation as a national power. Chinese policy makers focus on a stronger PRC becoming a dominant player in the region receiving due respect. Despite its desiring a peaceful international environment and promoting cooperative relations with its neighbors, the PRC continues to accelerate its defense modernization.³⁸ Increased economic power will lead to greater military expenditures in an effort to increase the PRC's national power to independently protect its national interests. This is a concern not only of both Koreas but a reunified Korea as well. The PRC has purchased SU-27 Flankers, T-72 tanks, S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and agreed to buy the MIG-31 Foxhound, Tu-22M Backfire bomber, and up to four Kilo submarines from Russia. China's defense spending has reached between 27 and 43 billion dollars. This does not take into account that actual military expenditures may be higher due to

³⁷ Harding, Harry, *China and Northeast Asia, The Political Dimension*, 1988, pg. 55.

³⁸ *Defense White Paper 1994-1995*, (Republic of Korea, The Ministry of National Defense, 1995), pg. 51.

resources that come to the PLA from other budgets.³⁹ A powerful, nationalistic PRC in the future may attempt to restore its historical role as the center of Asian culture and politics. However, Japan remains the traditional enemy of both Koreas; a fact that the PRC will continue to emphasize as the regional power balance readjusts. A successfully modernized PRC will prove a vital balance against Japanese influence in Northeast Asia.

A weak, reunified Korea would have similar concerns as a divided Korea regarding a powerful PRC. This type of reunified state would need financial assistance that could come from a modernized PRC, although the level would be dependent on the level of PRC financial growth. Primarily, assistance would come from Japan and the United States. This would provide the Japanese with a stronger hold on regional economic superiority and security issues. A reform minded PRC, whether fully modernized or not, would not be a threat to Korea as it would see this type of Japanese political and economic dominance as contrary to its national interests.

If the PRC suddenly becomes concerned over domestic turmoil or fails in modernizing its economy, then both Koreas will be adversely affected. South Korea will lose its new trading partner and become more dependent on the United States and Japan. North Korea would lose, not by choice, its only supporter for its regime's survival. If "cross recognition" does not materialize prior to a weakening PRC, the DPRK would find itself in a downward spiraling situation. This would not be good for enhancing the gradual reunification of the peninsula and the financial burden on Seoul. A weakened PRC would also catch the attention of a confident and assertive reunified Korea. As previously stated, a strong Korea that has a resource rich north can assert itself in the regional security dynamic in the face of a chaotic PRC. Korea would more than likely assert its independence in regional affairs seeking a more dominant role to counter any Japanese claims to superiority. It is possible, but highly unlikely, that this type of Korea would seek greater territorial sovereignty, particularly those claims that are historically justified.

³⁹ Sutter, Robert and Kan, Shirley, "China as a Security Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment, and U.S. Options," CRS Report for Congress, January 1994.

V. NORTHEAST ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The end of the Cold War has led to an increased emphasis for the establishment of a multilateral security framework for the Asia-Pacific region. Because of the region's complex security issues, a separate forum for Northeast Asia has been discussed and supported by the regional players. Although the end of the larger security dynamic has prompted greater economic development and integration, there are a substantial number of security issues that could lead to increased tension in the region. The first section of this chapter will review the current position of the four major regional actors on multilateral security. Each nation has promoted multilateral security dialogue and communication, but this is merely to discuss security problems rather than commit to cooperative defense. As each Northeast Asian state seeks to establish itself in the emerging regional order, no country is willing to forgo its bilateral agreements for a collective security institution. The second section of this chapter will focus on the problems that face a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia. Although NATO and CSCE type frameworks have been suggested, these institutions maintain particular principles that will not be accepted in Northeast Asia. The adoption of an APEC or ASEAN type forum overestimates the decision making ability of these institutions and places too great an optimistic outlook on economic interdependence. Considering these perceptions, bilateral arrangements should be the means for determining the future security dilemmas in Northeast Asia.

A. VIEWS ON MULTILATERAL SECURITY

1. The PRC

Beijing maintains a cautious approach regarding multilateral security for the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese expect that bilateral relations will continue to be the primary means for solving stability issues in the region. A PRC striving to modernize, to establish a greater regional role for itself, but hesitant to commit to any security framework determined by outside powers, seeks a balance of power in the region that would prevent the dominance of any one power. The PRC promotes the establishment of the Five

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the foundation on which the multilateral security process should be based.

Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC has more actively engaged in the discussion of multilateral security and economic cooperation. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the APEC meetings in Seoul in 1991 and in Seattle in 1993. The PRC holds "observer status" in ASEAN and is a participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). A more positive policy line towards multilateral security dialogue emerged in 1992 when Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu proposed, "To establish gradually a bilateral, sub-regional, and regional multichannel and multilayered security dialogue mechanism so as to hold consultations on the issues concerned and to strengthen interchange and confidence."¹ Qian Qichen stated;

As for security co-operation, in our view, we may start off with bilateral and regional security dialogues of various forms, at different levels and through various channels in response to the diversity of the region. Through such dialogues and consultation, we may improve our communication and confidence in one another. China will actively participate in these dialogues and consultations.²

Chinese officials have paid more attention to multilateral security cooperation as a means of constraining possible Japanese military assertiveness. Moreover, involvement in a multilateral security dialogue will reduce regional fears over the so called "China threat." Chinese officials feel that fears regarding a stronger PRC may lead to a new Japan-United States alliance against Beijing. Although this alliance prevents Japanese aggression, the alliance was established to counter the now dissolved Soviet Union. In the absence of this threat, the alliance may be used to counter the PRC.³ By engaging in cooperative security dialogues, Chinese leaders will be able to constrain Japan and promote their peaceful

¹ Shirk, Susan, "Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional Security Cooperation," *The National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis*, 5, no. 5, December 1994, pg. 7.

² Garret, Banning, and Glaser, Bonnie, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 16, no. 1, June 1994, pg. 15.

³ Shirk, Susan, "Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional Security Cooperation," *The National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis*, 1994, pg. 9.

intentions. However, PRC officials do not want the dialogue to be focused primarily against the PRC. Beijing wants all countries to be on an equal level, preventing the dominance of any one power over the establishment of security issues. Moreover, the PRC anticipates the possibility of ideological rhetoric against the Asian Communist countries.⁴ Military modernization has been a national interest of Beijing as well. Therefore, any dialogue against Chinese modernization would not be supported by the PRC.

The PRC remains favorable to multilateral dialogue and economic cooperation, but collective security is by far another matter. A nationalistic PRC is sensitive to territorial issues, ideological allies, and the makeup of its military force structure. Bilateral territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands, the Diaoyudao Islands, and Taiwan, should be left up to the powers concerned and not a regional security organization. The Taiwan issue is particularly sensitive since Beijing accepts Taiwan's participation in economic organizations like APEC but will not accept its participation in any regional security dialogue. Furthermore, the PRC is hesitant to be a part of any collective effort against North Korea. Beijing maintains amicable relations with both Pyongyang and Seoul. By pressuring the DPRK in a multilateral effort, Pyongyang might become hostile and react irrationally. Beijing wants to maintain the current status of its Korean relations as they are in its best interest to do so. A collective security regime would require military transparency to promote trust and build confidence amongst its members. The PRC is reluctant to view transparency as beneficial to its national security. Although transparency has been argued to lead to greater trust amongst powers, it makes a country more vulnerable. The PRC has traditionally viewed secrecy as a means of protection and deterrence. The PRC has used "ambiguity" as a means to protect itself. By being obscure about its military force, the PRC can prevent attack by potential enemies. A Chinese military officer stated, "if you have a military force that is able to defeat an enemy-like the United States-you can be transparent. But if you have a small force that cannot defeat its

⁴ Beijing criticized Assistant Secretary of Defense Winston Lord's remarks at his confirmation hearing declaring that four of five Communist countries exist in Asia.

enemies, you want secrecy.”⁵ Based on Beijing’s stance concerning territorial integrity, ideological commitments, and military modernization, bilateral agreements are more appropriate for the complex security issues in Northeast Asia.

2. Japan

The end of the Cold War security concerns has led to a greater emphasis on Japan’s ability to assume a larger role in regional political and security issues. Japan’s economic interests and concern over sea lines of communication (SLOC) essential to its national security, have forced Japan to seek a role in the establishment of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The Japanese government has significantly changed its view concerning Article Nine of its constitution that has directly affected its outlook on regional security. Japan’s first step towards multilateral security was its participation in the 1991 Kuala Lumpur ASEAN meeting. Foreign Minister Nakayama “proposed the institutionalization of an annual forum on regional security matters at which ASEAN and other interested parties could exchange views on the region’s security requirements.”⁶ In 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa expressed his concern for a more structured security framework than the ASEAN-PMC. In 1993, Miyazawa delivered a speech in Bangkok that the Japanese media deemed the “Miyazawa Doctrine.” In his speech, Miyazawa asserted that “the countries of the Asia-Pacific region need to develop a long-term vision regarding the future order of peace and security for their region...” and that “Japan will actively take part in such discussions.”⁷ Japanese officials are also more in favor of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a means of “building trust” among the eighteen Asian members and its dialogue partners. Akihiko Tanaka, assistant professor of international relations at Tokyo University saw ARF as the beginning of a “supra-national organization to handle security issues.” “Asia has lagged far behind Europe in its willingness to build

⁵ Garret, Banning, and Glaser, Bonnie, “Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing,” 1994, pg. 29.

⁶ Brown, Eugene, “Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Asian Survey*, XXXIV, no. 5, May 1994, pg. 442.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pg. 443.

common institutions, but acquiring the habit of dialogue may be a start.”⁸ Although Japan has committed itself to participation in multilateral security dialogue to address regional security issues through an ASEAN-PMC regime, it favors in the long run a more institutionalized regional mechanism like the CSCE. Japan, seeking to gain greater political influence in the region, favors the CSCE type forum. This security forum would allow Japan to preserve its national security and the opportunity to establish a political role equal to its national strength.

Although Japan has made some significant statements regarding multilateral security dialogue it is only in the establishment of a regional forum to discuss security matters. Japan remains committed to the bilateral security link with the United States seeking to complement this relationship with a multilateral security framework. Japan emphasizes “comprehensive security” rather than “collective security.” Comprehensive security focuses on the non-military means of achieving and maintaining security. Japan pursues its security goals by political, diplomatic, and economic means due to the limits of its constitution. Therefore, Japan rejects offensive military capabilities that provides reassurance to its neighbors. The United States-Japan alliance, however, provides greater reassurance to Japan’s Asian neighbors as well as the security of Japan. If this alliance unravels, Japan would be tempted to acquire offensive systems it currently lacks. Toshi Ozawa, director of the National Security Affairs Division of the Foreign Ministry stated that any reduction in U.S. forward presence “would force us to rethink our force structure.”⁹ Seizaburo Sato, a consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, “We (Japan) could build a nuclear bomb within six months.”¹⁰ Japan is already a key player in the region based on the level of Official Development Assistance, massive foreign investment, and economic cooperation within the region. Japan will seek a greater political role but how it will assert that role is a question that concerns not only the Japanese government and people but other Asian countries.

⁸ Smith, Charles, “A New Beginning,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 9, 1994.

⁹ Brown, Eugene, “Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” 1994, pg. 445.

¹⁰ Ibid., pg. 446.

3. South and North Korea

Since President Rhee tried to promote a "Northeast Asia Treaty Organization" in the 1940's, South Korea has been interested in promoting closer multilateral regional cooperation. The Association of Pacific Nations (ASPAC) of the 1960s and 1970s was also a South Korean initiative.¹¹ In 1988, President Roh Tae Woo proposed a six-nation "Consultative Conference" comprised of the United States, the Soviet Union, North and South Korea, Japan, and the PRC which "would deal with a broad range of ideas concerning stability, progress, and prosperity within the region."¹² In 1991, Roh's speech in the United States called for a "structure of cooperation in Northeast Asia." South Korean initiative for this approach was based on security issues on the Korean peninsula. The ROK has reemphasized its desire for multilateral security for the region in the face of a possible nuclear armed North Korea. South Korea and the United States agreed that "multilateral security dialogues can supplement their bilateral defense relations and enhance the building of a New Pacific Community."¹³

Due to the complexities of Northeast Asian security, South Korea has focused on the possibility of a multilateral security forum for Northeast Asia.¹⁴ This forum, however, would be based on a cooperative system to promote dialogue and prevent misunderstanding that could lead to tension and conflict. The dialogue would begin with common issues of interest to lay the groundwork for future complex security issues. The forum would be sub-regional to include Japan, the United States, the PRC, Russia, and North Korea. This inclusive membership is essential to maintain stability in the region.

¹¹ Macdonald, Donald Stone, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pg. 239. Australia and Canada also initiated multilateral security arrangements for the Asia-Pacific. In 1990, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans pushed for a CSCE type organization for Asia. Canada called for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) which would adapt confidence building measures to the region as in Europe.

¹² Mack, Andrew, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 11, no. 2, 1992, pg. 22.

¹³ "Multilateral Security in N.E. Asia stressed at Forum," *The Korea Herald*, November 7, 1993, pg. 3.

¹⁴ The following ROK views towards multilateralism were cited from, Tate, Sam, "Toward Multilateral Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia," Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, December 1994.

Despite the favorable inclinations towards a multilateral Northeast Asian security framework, South Korea is not ready to abandon its bilateral treaty with the United States.

U.S. centered bilateral security arrangements have contributed to the regional stability during the Cold War as well as at present due to their particular fortes: firmly committed military forces on the basis of bilateral treaties, prompt decision-making between two parties, and successful military cooperation.¹⁵

However, these bilateral treaties may not be sufficient enough to cope with the uncertainties of the future Asia-Pacific.

Multilateral arrangements in Asia would need several additional features. They would have to cover a larger area, geographically and strategically, than the bilateral treaties. They must deal with a much wider range of interests that cannot be properly addressed by the bilateral treaties....Developing multilateral security structures in the face of multiple and more diffused threats, however will not be easy, so a step-by step approach will be necessary.¹⁶

South Korea has favored multilateral security dialogue but does not want any regional forum discussing Korean unification issues that Seoul considers a "Korean problem." The Korean peninsula subjects Northeast Asia to the possibility of conflict more than the rest of the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, a sub-regional forum to discuss security matters would be beneficial but commitment by the major players to collective security is highly unlikely. North Korea remains at the center of South Korean national security concerns. Clearly a multilateral response towards the DPRK's nuclear development is beneficial to regional stability. Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT on 12 March 1993 caused considerable anxiety amongst the regional powers. Pyongyang, distrusting the United States nuclear stance, saw the possession of nuclear weapons as essential for its national survival. On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea reached an agreement regarding the DPRK's nuclear program. The deal negotiated with the United States was for two modern light-water reactors estimated to be worth four billion dollars

¹⁵ Song, Young Sun, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 5, no. 1, Summer 1993, pg. 198.

¹⁶ Ibid., pg. 198.

in return for the North's promise to shut down Yongbyon, "freeze" its nuclear program, and abstain from refueling its two existing reactors. These two reactors are less proliferation prone than the existing reactor at Yongbyon but will take at least ten years to build.¹⁷ North Korea accepted the South Korean built nuclear reactors in June 1995 so long as there was no "made in Korea" label on them.¹⁸ Pyongyang's dealings regarding the nuclear issue have been strictly bilateral and North Korean officials have done all they can to deal directly with the United States. South Korea had asked for Chinese assistance over Pyongyang but the Chinese, although in favor of a denuclearized peninsula, were unwilling to pressure North Korea on its nuclear program. Moreover, under the present agreement, IAEA inspection will not occur for at least five years, until the promised reactors are built. At this time, the DPRK may refuse to reveal its plutonium production or have perfected a nuclear weapon. North Korea has already broken all its previous nuclear promises.¹⁹ There are also other security issues that the DPRK is not so ready to resolve. Existing nuclear hardware, the reduction of its military forces aimed at the South, its increasing isolation compared to South Korea, and reunification of the peninsula.

North Korea has made no indications of its agreement to any type of regional security forum, although the regional powers have indicated that North Korea's inclusion in regional security dialogue is essential for building trust and confidence. The DPRK, however, has opened up to economic interdependence with South Korea, Mongolia, China and Russia on the Tumen River Area Development Project. North Korea realizes that its national survival depends on the trade and investment with its neighbors.

4. The United States

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has maintained its influence in the region through its bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea. These alliances have been the center for the United States' Asian position. The Treaty of Mutual

¹⁷ "North Korea takes the money," *The Economist*, June 14-20, 1995, pg. 36.

¹⁸ "North Korea Battling on," *The Economist*, June 17, 1995, pg. 37.

¹⁹ North Korea has held the non-proliferation cause hostage in the search for "compensations." See "Storing up trouble," *The Economist*, October 22, 1994, pg. 19-20.

Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, in 1951, provided a weak Japan with United States protection against the evolving Soviet threat. This treaty provided what Yoshida wanted most, a long-term guarantee of Japan's security by the United States. This was later referred to the Japanese "nuclear umbrella." Despite the outbreak of the Korean War and the pressure from John Foster Dulles, special emissary of the United States Secretary of State, Yoshida refused to rearm Japan citing Article 9 of Japan's new constitution. Yoshida made two concessions to Dulles: United States bases in Japan and establishment of a small military force called the National Police Reserve, renamed the Self Defense Forces in 1954.²⁰ The Yoshida Doctrine focused on economic matters as Japan generally followed the lead of the United States on strategic, political, and security issues. This policy served Japan well for nearly half a century.²¹ The Korean War forged the military alliance between the United States and South Korea to prevent the spread of Communism into the South and possibly the rest of Asia. American forces in the ROK continue to protect it from possible invasion from the North and provide stability to the region. Each treaty was a separate, bilateral agreement to primarily contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and counter the threat of the DPRK and the PRC.²²

Throughout the Cold War there was little emphasis on establishing multilateral security regimes by the United States although the concepts were discussed. The United States also considered the Pacific Alliance Treaty Organization (PATO) which was to be a NATO equivalent in the Pacific, however, the plan was not carried out because the Pentagon felt it could not afford the leadership role for defense in both Europe and Asia against the Communist threat.²³ At the time, Europe was more critical to American

²⁰ Fairbank, John, Reischauer, Edwin, and Craig, Albert, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), pg. 826.

²¹ Brown, Eugene, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," 1994, pg. 430.

²² See Olsen, Edward and Winterford, David, "Asian Multilateralism: Implications for US Policy," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, VI, no. 1, Summer 1994, pg. 16-28, for a more detailed account of the "double containment" implications of these bilateral treaties.

²³ Contrary to the Pentagon's views at the time, the United States actually played a more central leadership role in the security of Asia through its bilateral relations.

interests than Asia. The United States did support the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in 1954, in order to balance against China. This organization was composed of Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines but dissolved following the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1976. Furthermore, the United States throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, was concerned with the Soviet threat. In 1990, the United States rejected an Australian CSCA proposal and the Canadian NPCSD proposal for regional security frameworks.

Washington believed that Moscow would take advantage of multilateral security forums to push for security measures (such as naval arms control) which might have seemed superficially attractive but were inimical to the United States-and thus regional-security interests.²⁴

Such a framework would limit naval arms control in which the United States had superiority. The Bush administration was cautious regarding its view towards multilateralism but there was renewed interest in multilateral security forums. United States Secretary of State, William Baker, visited Seoul and Tokyo to attend the third APEC meeting, and announced that active support from countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula was needed to promote reunification dialogue. He suggested a "two plus four" dialogue between South and North Korea and the four major powers in Northeast Asia. This plan was shelved following South Korean statements that dialogue on issues pertaining the security of the peninsula should be discussed by the two Koreas.²⁵ South Korea was concerned with Japan's involvement with North Korea without strengthening ROK-Japan ties. Because the United States maintained military superiority in its bilateral relationships, it was not in favor of changing the status quo in favor of a security forum that may have reduced American influence. Domestic concerns led to the election of a new president with a new focus on regional security issues.

These two treaties have been crucial to United States security thinking in the Asia-Pacific, however, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused

²⁴ Mack, Andrew, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," 1992, pg. 23.

²⁵ Song, Young Sun, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," 1993, pg. 193-194.

a refocusing of American views towards multilateralism. The absence of this rival, along with the increasing domestic pressure to balance the national budget, has led to a reduction in defense expenditures and a reassessment of American commitment to its allies. Japanese and South Korean economic growth and military strength, relative to the region, provide these countries the capability to take an active role in regional security. The decline of American economic strength has led the United States to question its ability to take sole responsibility for Asia's security.

The Clinton administration has been more supportive of multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific. Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in a statement to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that the United States was "prepared with others to explore through dialogue and consultations new Asia-Pacific paths toward security." He indicated that one of the goals of American policy in Asia would be "developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances."²⁶ Lord, at a Senate Committee meeting, declared that "under this administration you will see a willingness to explore, first, consultations and dialogue which may lead eventually over time, to new institutions."²⁷ Obviously committed to some form of a multilateral framework, the question remained on the structure of this framework. Lord was quick to point out that entering into regional security dialogues would "supplement, not supplant our allies and our alliances and our forward presence."²⁸ Lord ruled out a structure similar to the CSCE because in Asia there was "no common enemy and it is a much more diverse mosaic."²⁹ The purpose is preventive diplomacy. Lord stated;

The point here is to get countries sitting around a table and conveying their intentions, whether it's on military budgets or territorial claims, to try to

²⁶ "East Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Policy and Assistance," *Dispatch*, 4, no. 21, May 24, 1993.

²⁷ Awanohara, Susumu, "Group Therapy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 156, no. 15, 15 April 1993, pg. 11.

²⁸ Lord, Winston, "U.S. Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region," cited in *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, 1994, pg. 16.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pg. 16.

erase misperceptions, lower tensions, enact confidence building measures,
deter arms races and prevent conflicts....³⁰

The administration did support the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum. This inclusive consultative group first met in July 1994 and is believed could play an important role in conveying the concerns stated above. The United States did feel it was necessary to establish a separate dialogue group for Northeast Asia, in which the United States was, "together with others...laying the groundwork for a smaller forum for Northeast Asia, an area where great powers have clashed historically and the locus of the region's most urgent security challenges."³¹

B. PROBLEMS WITH COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Despite the post-Cold War trends towards Asian multilateralism, there are significant obstacles to the formation of a regional security framework in Northeast Asia. This thesis has tried to emphasize the deep rooted historical suspicions that underline Northeast Asian relations. The resurfacing of nationalism will cause the greatest obstacle to a collective security arrangement in the region. Nationalism has asserted itself in territorial disputes and military expenditures. Collective security is defined on the premise that peace is indivisible, so that "war against one state is... considered a war against all.... Facing the prospect of such a community-wide response, any rational potential aggressor would be deterred and would desist."³² The existing structures of NATO, CSCE, APEC, and ASEAN cannot be successfully applied to an Asian collective security framework. A NATO or CSCE type organization requires the common perception that all countries are equal, consensus for arms agreements, and that someone will lead. APEC and ASEAN, primarily economic institutions, assume that the promotion of free trade and economic interdependence will lead to stability.

³⁰ Ibid., pg. 16.

³¹ Lord, Winston, "U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific," Department of State, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, February 9, 1995.

³² Ruggie, John, "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution," *International Organization*, 46, no. 3, Summer 1992, pg. 569.

NATO was formed to counter the threat of Germany and the expansion of the Soviet Union. In this framework, the larger powers, particularly the United States, were willing to forfeit their national interests for the greater good of defending their allies against a hostile power; the Soviet Union.³³ This type of principle would not necessarily occur in Asia. For one, a common threat would be required. In Northeast Asia the threats are overlapping; the PRC views Japan as a threat, South Korea sees North Korea and Japan as threats, and Japan keeps a close watch on Russia, North Korea, and the PRC. These suspicions are imbedded in the traditional views of each country. Moreover, even during the larger Cold War dynamic, there was no evidence of a collective security arrangement amongst the Asian states. Security was provided through bilateral relations with United States, which included the balancing act of the PRC between the Soviet Union and the United States. Within NATO, the United States has traditionally been the assertive player in determining levels of military involvement and decision making. In order for a collective security arrangement to exist in Northeast Asia, each country would have to be comfortable with one of the others taking the lead in decision making. Japan would not likely assume this role due to its Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere past, nor would the PRC with its "Middle Kingdom" baggage. That would leave the United States to take the lead, which would leave impressions of an outside Western power "dictating" policies for Asia. Even if a highly nationalistic PRC or Japan was willing to assert political influence, the other would directly oppose such leadership.

The CSCE framework has been sought as an example for Asian multilateral security framework. It has been clearly stated that the adoption of the exact structure of the CSCE is inappropriate for Asia due to Asia's complex political, geographical, and cultural characteristics, although its principles that attempt to minimize conflict through dialogue and cooperation could be applied.³⁴ CSCE does not have a military component

³³ With the end of the Cold War and the inability of NATO to achieve its goals in the Bosnia conflict, the question remains whether NATO should continue to exist. The breakup of NATO would have a direct impact on Asian views towards the purpose of multilateral security organizations.

³⁴ See Mack, Andrew, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," 1992, and Mack, Andrew, and Kerr, Pauline, "The evolving security discourse in the Asia-Pacific," *The Washington Quarterly*, 18, no. 1, Winter 1995, and Song, Young Sun, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," 1993.

at its disposal. Therefore, this dialogue structure could be applied to Asia but not in a collective security sense. Furthermore, the CSCE maintains European principles of individual rights, faith in democracy, free and competitive markets, and free elections. Clearly, the countries of Asia would have conflicting views regarding any council established on these premises. The point is that any dialogue council would have to maintain some common interests beyond economics to hold it together. Furthermore, the members of the CSCE have consensus on arms reduction evidenced by the CFE. "Most of the regional states do not believe that their military modernization programs should be constrained by externally imposed limits on the number or types of weapons they acquire." On this topic, Malaysia's defense minister noted, "Such modernization should be seen as a positive step towards achieving regional stability."³⁵ As defense expenditures have declined in the United States and Europe, they have increased in the Asia-Pacific. In 1993, the Asia-Pacific led the world in the acquisition of naval combat vessels, combat aircraft, and surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Moreover, 1,500 fighter aircraft will be procured this decade in Northeast Asia, 300 in Southeast Asia. In 1995, the region made up thirty-eight percent of the world's arms transfers and, excluding Japan that has the largest regional defense budget, Northeast Asian states have increased their defense budgets ten percent or more a year.³⁶

If one considers the use of the framework of APEC or ASEAN for a regional security framework, then one must assume that economic interdependence will lead to greater stability in the region. True, economics is the key issue that is in common with all the East Asian nations and with the collapse of the Soviet threat, economics becomes a greater factor in national security. However, economic interdependence does not necessarily lead to stability. In both regional economic institutions, there is an absence of any means to timely solve economic disputes let alone the possibility to promptly resolve security issues. APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, is the most developed

³⁵ Mack, Andrew, and Kerr, Pauline, "The evolving security discourse in the Asia-Pacific," 1995, pg. 129.

³⁶ Data reported from, Mack, Andrew, and Kerr, Pauline, "The evolving security discourse in the Asia-Pacific," 1995, and *Strategic Assessment 1995*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995).

economic organization in the region but despite the emphasis by the United States to upgrade the status of APEC, this institution will not be able to extend its issues to security. Mainly, "...such widely dispersed countries are involved and decisions are made on the basis of consensus, it is rather difficult to expect timely and substantial decision-making."³⁷ Winston Lord, although seeing APEC as the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, declared "it will be restricted...for the time being and as far ahead as I can see, to economic issues. It will not become a security organization."³⁸ There is also no common sense of goodwill between the nations to foster economic cooperation. "The fact that ASEAN can agree not to tax the importation of snowplows but has failed to open up its markets to more 'popular' products illustrates the depth of the problem."³⁹

ASEAN has shown an increased emphasis towards multilateral security dialogue but is incapable of addressing issues in Northeast Asia. ASEAN and the ASEAN-PMC are primarily made up of Southeast Asian nations that cannot handle security issues in Northeast Asia with the same concern as those in Southeast Asia. Any attempts to expand the ASEAN-PMC into a regional security arrangement would have significant limitations. South Korea does not want its security and unification issue to be discussed by ASEAN. The PRC does not want other countries discussing its reunification with Taiwan as well. Neither North Korea nor Taiwan is a member of the ASEAN-PMC, therefore discussing these security issues becomes more difficult. The ASEAN nations are more prone to multilateral security forums than Northeast Asia. However, like the Northeast Asian states, ASEAN countries do have problems such as military transparency and the rejection of any proposed military alliance amongst its members.⁴⁰ ASEAN members are more

³⁷ Song, Young Sun, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," 1993, pg. 201.

³⁸ Lord, Winston, "U.S. Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region," 1994, pg. 15.

³⁹ Buzan, Barry, and Segal, Gerald, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival*, 36, no. 2, Summer 1994, pg. 12.

⁴⁰ See Acharya, Amitav, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN," *Journal of Peace Research*, 29, no. 1, 1992, for a more detailed analysis of ASEAN's limitations. No ASEAN country sees regional military cooperation as a substitute for security links with external powers. ASEAN states see the continued maintenance of a

content with bilateral cooperation rather than "collective" security. The ASEAN Regional Forum's first meeting was held on July 25, 1994. This was the first major step to discuss political and security cooperation in the region. Members of ASEAN, its dialogue partners, and observers, except North Korea, attended. ARF's agenda remains undefined, complicated by issues that "range from the Korean peninsula to the Tasman Sea."⁴¹ Tension rose as ASEAN remained focused on security discussions rather than formal agreements to build relationships.

If economic interdependence is uneven in East Asia, with Japan providing most of the capital and technology for growth, new power relations will develop based on dominance and dependence.⁴² There is a deep sense of competition for economic resources in the region. Japan is highly dependent on foreign oil and the preservation of the SLOC. The PRC is seeking dominance in the South China Sea over the Spratly Islands for their possible resources. South and North Korea are also highly dependent on energy supplies and long sea lines of communication. The pattern for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has been referred to as the "Flying Geese Pattern" with Japan as the lead goose and the other nations following in formation. It is not so clear that the other countries would be so comfortable to follow Japan or allow Japan to lead the rest of the region.

The states of Northeast Asia have been less enthusiastic towards multilateral security primarily because the relationships between them, as emphasized in the previous chapters, have ranged from apathetic to antagonistic. The nationalistic overtones of all the countries have resurfaced in their position on territorial and military force issues. Furthermore, the key issues in Northeast Asia are primarily bilateral not multilateral: the unification of the two Koreas; the PRC-Taiwan dispute; the Kurile Island dispute between

regional 'balance of power' conducive to their security interests as being contingent on a strong external input; it cannot be developed only through regional military security cooperation....

⁴¹ Solomon, Richard, "Post-Cold War Security Structures," in *Asia in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael Bellows, 1994, pg. 250.

⁴² Ibid., pg. 13. See Buzan and Segal "Rethinking East Asian Security" for a more detailed critical perspective on economic interdependence and national security in East Asia.

Russia and Japan; the dispute over the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands between the PRC and Japan; and the PRC's claim to the Spratly Islands. All the states in Northeast Asia have increased their defense budgets since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The build up of defensive military hardware or the modernization of military forces leads to what Andrew Mack calls "security dilemmas." These situations arise when,

The defensive preparations of one state are taken as evidenced of hostile intent by rival states, which in turn increase their defensive capabilities-creating concern in the first state and so forth. These concerns can lead to 'conflict spirals' where the essentially defensive actions of the two sides generate ever-increasing suspicion and hostility, an arms race, and finally lead to a military confrontation that neither side originally sought.⁴³

Northeast Asia has a common interest in economic development. However, as each nation develops, more funds will be devoted to military defense budgets. Military assets will be used to defend territorial integrity, maintain oil imports, and the vital sea lines of communication. As previously discussed, each state remains suspicious of the others. As each state becomes more nationalistic in its regional outlook it will become a threat to the national interests of the others. One of the primary principles on which NATO was established was the common security threat that the Soviet Union posed upon the members. There is no common threat to the Northeast Asian nations, except that they view each other as potential rivals. Collective security in Northeast Asia is highly unlikely for the twenty-first century based on the traditional suspicions and animosity between the states that overshadows their economic cooperation. Although security dialogue for the region is a means of reducing tension and misunderstanding, and a sub-regional dialogue should exist for Northeast Asia's unique problems, no state will submit to a collective security arrangement. This perception has direct impact on the future role of the United States in the region and implications for American Asia-Pacific policy.

⁴³ Mack, Andrew, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," 1992, pg. 31.

VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONALISM ON AMERICAN POLICY IN NORTHEAST ASIA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The end of the Cold War requires the United States to reassess its role in the Asia-Pacific to adapt to the newly emerging security environment. A more defined and flexible Northeast Asia policy is required to face the emerging strategic and economic concerns for the twenty-first century. Due to the decline in American economic strength and domestic issues, the level of United States' influence in Asia is under scrutiny. The United States has a significant interest in the region as trade with East Asia is approximately forty percent greater than that with Europe. There are several principles that policymakers should keep in mind as the United States redefines the role it will play in the establishment of security in the region. First, to assert its economic competitiveness as well as establish flexibility in its security relations, a careful look at the concerns and relations between the Northeast Asian states will be essential. As indicated by this thesis, these states are becoming more nationalistic in their regional diplomacy. The United States will need to assert itself in the region to protect its vital interests but prevent any lecturing or posturing that will attract cries of "American Imperialism" or dominance. Second, reassessment of existing bilateral agreements and the forging of new bilateral relations with regional actors will provide the United States with the best means of achieving its national interests in the region. Military presence will be absolutely necessary to help define the new balance of power in the region as increased defense expenditures and territorial sovereignty disputes characterize the future strategic environment. Following the reunification of Korea, this presence should be restricted to battle groups and basing privileges rather than bases on Asian soil. Finally, the United States should not ignore multilateral security forums that promote dialogue and trust-building measures. United States presence at these forums promotes its interests and enhances its regional reputation, however, the United States should not base its security policy on the viability of these forums. The United States needs to formulate its policies bearing in mind the strength of nationalism in Northeast Asia and the fact that no state is ready to give into multilateralism over bilateral relations.

The current search for self respect in world power relations along with the absence of the Cold War restraints, has facilitated the recent resurgence of nationalism in all three countries. Nationalism has become interwoven in the regional balance of power, forcing the United States to acknowledge Asian assertiveness. United States' policy should be sensitive to Asian nationalism, recognize the importance of Asian values, and resist the tendency to promote American values on these nations. One of America's vital interests is "to promote a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish."¹ "The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" states that "Democracy and human rights are universal yearnings and universal norms, just as powerful in Asia as elsewhere."² Underlining this principle is the concept that democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development. Although this is generally true, the problem exists when one tries to define democracy. Not all United States' allies are democracies nor do they all practice the same democratic policies. Furthermore, laws, institutions, and cultural commitments determine the rights that will be accepted by a society. To promote American democracy disregards what the Asian states define as "democracy" considering the Western interpretation as the universal norm. Without institutions and a strong populace committed to the rule of law and an open society, diplomacy will not bring greater respect for democracy and human rights but only political dilemmas. Democracy cannot be exported nor promoted, but merely encouraged and supported. A more advantageous, strategic position for the United States would be to distance itself from the moral principles that characterize its Asian policy since more nationalistic states will tend to view United States' criticism regarding human rights as intrusive. Moreover, United States' policy has primarily focused on the PRC despite previous "less than democratic"

¹ "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," Department of Defense, February 1995, pg. 5.

² "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," The White House, February 1995, pg. 29.

domestic policies in South Korea and Japan.³ American resentment of the Harry Wu case only creates greater animosity when one country attempts to dictate the domestic policy of another. Furthermore, the mere labeling of the national strategy as "Enlargement" has significant overtones in the PRC. The United States feels a moral obligation to defend the rights of mankind but will find itself alone in its enforcement of human rights in Asia. The Northeast Asian states share a Confucian tradition where the individual is taught to live in harmony with the environment, promote community welfare, and prevent disorder. Therefore, collective rights are more important than individual rights. Any lecturing of the concept of morality and ethics from a country that is not a signatory of the UN Declaration of Human Rights would be hypocritical. Defense of human rights is a part of the United States' political culture and constitutional tradition. Therefore, support should be maintained regarding torture, slavery, genocide and jurisprudence. Quiet diplomacy, private discussions through diplomatic channels, allows the Asian states, particularly the PRC, to resolve situations without appearing to back down in the face of the United States' demands. It is highly unlikely that the United States will change Beijing's views towards democracy as defined by the West. To impose the American conception of human rights on states whose human rights are derived from contrasting cultural and political tradition, will strain foreign relations.

The most effective way to maintain stability in the region is through balance of power. The overriding security threat of the Soviet Union and a structure to protect United States' interests do not exist. Therefore, the United States should reassess its existing bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea. Currently, these bilateral alliances are based on Cold War perceptions. A redefinition and constant revision of these military alliances will be required to establish America's new position in the newly

³ The South Korean government from 1948-1988, under Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan, experienced political upheavals, martial law, six constitutional changes, and the suppression of anti-government sentiment. During this period, authoritarian-like policies were implemented and considered essential for national security and economic development. Japan continues its prejudice against Koreans living in Japan and the Barakumin. Furthermore, Article 13 of Japan's Constitution provides the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as long as it "does not interfere with the public welfare." The United States overlooked these "democratic" inconsistencies of its two allies for more important regional security issues and U.S. national interests of the period. Moreover, the United States sought to avoid criticizing the "democratic" administrations that it had played a significant role establishing in South Korea and Japan.

emerging Asia-Pacific environment. Without going into in-depth analysis on the validity of these alliances, these security agreements, established to counter the Soviet threat, are no longer applicable to the security atmosphere of the region. These alliances commit United States forces to the defense of these states. Therefore, in the absence of the Soviet Union, the PRC sees these alliances not as instruments of peace but as a means of "containment" against its rising status. Asian suspicions, trade protectionism, and territorial sovereignty disputes will lead to greater conflicts in the region. It would be more favorable for the United States to be flexible in multi-bilateral relations that enable it to adapt to the changing environment rather than be tied militarily to any one power.

Most likely, China and Japan will balance each other for regional influence in the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century. Forging a bilateral relationship with the PRC would give the United States more leverage in the emerging balance of power. Based on their historical and more recent relations, expressed in Chapter II, the PRC and Japan will never become close on security matters. Furthermore, the Mutual Security Treaty, seen as a means of limiting an independent Japanese military by some conservatives, will not survive the attacks of a nationalistic trend in Japan. Any nationalistic mood in Japan would cause a restructuring of the United States-Japan security alliance that would lead to greater military expenditures for Japan. This would prompt a direct response from a nationalistic PRC.

The United States would not necessarily want to be tied to the defense of Japan if conflict broke out between the two states. In the short term, a complete break of the United States-Japan alliance would not be a practical option for either country. If the United States loosens security ties with the region and protectionist trade policies develop between the two, Japan would be isolated. Presently, there is no other country in the region to take the place of the United States as an economic partner. Japan would be unable to maintain its standard of living and its national security. Left with two alternatives, "Guns versus Butter," Japan would either have to commit greater resources to build a military, sacrificing economic growth or forfeit greater economic advancement for increased defense expenditures. A greater Japanese military role will generate anxiety in the region over a remilitarized Japan, while promoting economic regionalism will

hinder Japanese self defense against a growing PRC. Japan, therefore, will maintain its bilateral security relationship with the United States while fostering support for multilateral security dialogue to establish greater political influence in the region.

To maintain leverage in the region, the United States can reassess its bilateral relations with its Asian allies and foster new ones. Assuming the PRC will maintain a moderate level of reform and proceed with economic development into the next century, the United States should fully engage the PRC economically but prepare to balance it militarily. Bilateral relations with a reunified Korea, Vietnam and the ASEAN members can lead to a more flexible response to the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.⁴ The Korean Peninsula will inevitably be reunified in the near future. Therefore, establishing bilateral economic relations with the DPRK will reduce the financial burden upon reunification with the ROK. Close bilateral relations with both Koreas will provide a better opportunity for favorable United States relations with a reunified Korea. Following reunification, the United States must be ready to remove forces from the peninsula as well as reexamine its security treaty with the ROK. Currently, the United States can maintain forces on the peninsula defining their role as protection against an invasion from the DPRK. Once this threat is gone, a new relationship must be established to maintain United States' economic and strategic interests. A reunified Korea, weak or strong, will be a fulcrum in the security arrangements of Northeast Asia. Considering its unstable historic relations with Japan, a reunified Korea would more than likely lean towards the PRC than Japan. The United States could play a large role in providing aid and assistance to a newly reunified Korea. Providing high technologies and resources to Korea would counter the dominating presence of Japan. Furthermore, close relations with a reunified Korea would provide leverage against a nationalistic PRC that may not be comfortable with a strongly reunified Korea. The United States should anticipate generating solid relations with a reunified Korea to balance a nationalistic PRC and Japan.

American relations with Vietnam and the ASEAN states will further balance the two rising powers. Vietnam and the Southeast Asian countries, traditionally, are not

⁴ See Johnson, Chalmers, "Rethinking Asia," *The National Interest*, 32, Summer 1993, for a detailed analysis on United States post-Cold War relations with Asia.

comfortable with the prospects of an assertive PRC or Japan. These states, too weak to counter the Soviet threat alone, established ASEAN during the Cold War as a means to prevent conflict and resolve disputes among its members as well as improve their bargaining power against the superpower dynamic. However, ASEAN has historically acted on bilateral agreements between members on military-security issues. ASEAN members opposed any form of multilateral security cooperation and agreed that bilateral arrangements were more desirable to address security issues. The chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces stated,

Bilateral defense cooperation is flexible and provides wide ranging options. It allows any ASEAN partner to decide the type, time and scale of aid it requires and can provide. The question of national independence and sovereignty is unaffected by the decision of others as in the case of an alliance where members can evoke the terms of the treaty and interfere in the affairs of another partner.⁵

ASEAN states cannot replace the necessity of external powers for national security. Nor does ASEAN or ARF provide a significant deterrence to regional threats from the primary actors or a means to solve the issues among its members. ASEAN states have viewed possible withdrawal of American forces from the region as a catalyst to greater PRC and Japanese military expansion. Closer ties with the ASEAN states will provide these countries with the connection to an external power as well as markets for the economic development of their economies. By promoting a common agreements, not an alliances, applicable to all Asian states, the United States will establish an equidistant and non-dominating regional policy respecting Asian desires to assert political independence in the region. This agreement should be based on seeking the establishment of "global peace and friendship, freedom of navigation and commerce" throughout the region.

The probability for conflict remains a consideration in Northeast Asia, thus, American military presence is required for stability in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, the PRC sees American influence, although through its security alliance, over Japan as a means of restricting Japanese military expansion. Likewise, South Korea remains

⁵ Acharya, Amitav, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN," 1992, pg. 13.

favorable to United States presence to counter any invasion by North Korea, and the DPRK sees it as a means to prevent South Korea from invading its territory. As previously mentioned, ASEAN states view American presence as a means to counter Japanese dominance. However, budgetary concerns have led to the reduction of the United States' hegemonic power in the region which has caused concern within the decision making ranks of the Asian States and generated new challenges to American authority. The PRC has viewed the United States-Japan alliance as a "containment" policy, some South Koreans have voiced their opinion that perhaps it is time for the United States to withdraw its forces, and the right wing politicians in Japan have asserted that paying for American forces in Japan is no longer necessary for Japanese defense. Despite these views, American military presence will be required to maintain the United States' vital interests and regional security. The question remains how much military presence should be required. A new strategy for the United States would be to act as an "engaged balancer."⁶ This policy would place economic priorities first over security concerns and would emphasize strong ties with all the major countries of Asia to best protect American national interests. The United States remains the only power in position to play the role as balancer in Northeast Asia. Historically, the United States has never used imperialism to promote its interests in Northeast Asia. American military forces are essential to foster stability in a region where nationalistic tendencies have emerged. United States' troops should remain in Korea until the reunification issue is solved. Following reunification, troops should be withdrawn and replaced with basing agreements for American forces much like the present agreement with Singapore. In the meantime, the alliance with Japan should focus on the withdrawal of troops from American bases to be replaced with base agreements for American forces. This would reduce animosity with the PRC and redefine the American force presence as a regional security mechanism and not as a supplement to Japanese defense.

Promoting bilateral relations does not mean the United States should abstain from supporting multilateral dialogue. As stated in the "United States Security Strategy for the

⁶ Ellings, Richard, and Olsen, Edward, "A New Pacific Profile," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89, Winter 1993, pg. 116-136.

East Asia-Pacific Region,” “These bilateral commitments remain inviolable, and the end of the Cold War has not diminished their importance. Moreover, the United States interest in developing layers of multilateral ties in the region will not undermine the significance of core bilateral ties.”⁷ Multilateral dialogue over economic and security issues promotes confidence among the actors and ensures a stake in the outcomes of the region. A separate dialogue should exist for Northeast Asia due to its complex security environment. However, multilateralism in the form of security should not be the focus of United States’ Asian policy for the twenty-first century. Security dialogue could focus on non-proliferation issues, arms control and generating trust among the nations. But American policy should not depend on these organizations nor should decision makers get overly excited about the outcomes. Dialogue is just that, merely statements about a countries intentions that can change when threats or domestic issues change. Therefore, security in the region should be defined by bilateral agreements that provide the most flexibility to defend a country’s national interests.

The United States needs to reassert itself in the emerging Asian order. To do so, United States’ interests must be clearly defined without provoking anti-American sentiment. American prestige must be redefined through a reassessment of its security commitments and respect for Asian values. As each Northeast Asian state begins to reassert itself in the region, the United States can be in the position to be an “honest broker,” promoting its economic interests while subtly providing stability in the region through its bilateral relations. A security prism, founded on bilateral agreements with the United States acting as the common link between the PRC, a reunified Korea, and Japan, would be a successful policy to lead the region into the twenty-first century.

⁷ “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” Department of Defense, February 1995, pg. 6.

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